Dataset of Electoral Volatility in the European Parliament elections since 1979

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Codebook (July 31, 2019)

Description

This dataset provides data on electoral volatility and its internal components in the elections for the European Parliament (EP) in all European Union (EU) countries since 1979 or the date of their accession to the Union. It also provides data about electoral volatility for both the class bloc and the demarcation bloc. This dataset will be regularly updated so as to include the next rounds of the European Parliament elections.

Content

**Country**: country where the EP election is held (in alphabetical order)

**Election_year**: year in which the election is held

**Election_date**: exact date of the election

**RegV**: electoral volatility caused by vote switching between parties that enter or exit from the party system. A party is considered as entering the party system where it receives at least 1% of the national share in election at time $t+1$ (while it received less than 1% in election at time $t$). Conversely, a party is considered as exiting the party system where it receives less than 1% in election at time $t+1$ (while it received at least 1% in election at time $t$).

**AltV**: electoral volatility caused by vote switching between existing parties, namely parties receiving at least 1% of the national share in both elections under scrutiny.

**OthV**: electoral volatility caused by vote switching between parties falling below 1% of the national share in both the elections at time $t$ and $t+1$. It is important to clarify that this category is not computed by aggregating the scores of each party falling below 1% and then comparing the overall sum at time $t$ and $t+1$, unless in the few cases where disaggregated data of the ‘Others’ category were unavailable (see notes on individual countries on this point). Conversely, each party’s volatility is counted separately and then added to the calculation of OthV. This choice has been made to avoid underestimation of Total Volatility.
but at the same time to maintain a distinction between parties above 1% and parties below 1% for the
calculation of the two components of RegV and AltV.

**TV**: total electoral volatility in the party system, given by the sum of the previous measures. \( \text{RegV} + \text{AltV} + \text{OthV} = \text{TV} \).

**ClassBlocV**: net change in the aggregate vote share for all parties included in the Class Bloc

**DemBlocV**: net change in the aggregate vote share for all parties included in the Demarcation Bloc

**Sources**

The sources for the electoral results in the EP elections have been the official data provided by the
pertinent electoral authority in each country. For certain elections for which national electoral authorities
do not provide disaggregated information for minor parties we have supplemented them with other non-
onofficial online sources. Details about sources and other methodological choices are specified below in the
notes on the individual countries. The availability of complete electoral data including all parties
contesting the EP elections has allowed for an accurate calculation of Total Volatility and its internal
components.

**Methodological criteria**

The index of electoral volatility has been originally developed by Pedersen (1979). Given the emphasis
on the internal components of the index of electoral volatility, the most important question has been that
of understanding when a party can be considered as ‘new’ and included in the calculation of RegV. On
this point, also for the sake of consistency with volatility data in the general elections, we have followed
the same choices by Emanuele (2015) in the ‘Dataset of Electoral Volatility and its internal components
in Western Europe (1945-2015)’. Therefore, we have relied on the classic criteria set by Bartolini and
Mair (1990 [2007] 283–284) regarding mergers and splits of existing parties: when two or more parties
merge to form a new party, or when two or more parties merge with an existing party, electoral volatility
is computed by subtracting the vote share of the new party from the combined vote share of the merging
parties in the election immediately preceding the merger. When a party splits into two or more parties,
electoral volatility is computed by subtracting the combined vote share of the new parties from that of
the original party in the election immediately preceding the split. Following again Bartolini and Mair’s
choices, we have considered as splits all those separations that derive from official decisions of a minority
within the structure of a given party. As a consequence, splits and mergers have been included in the
calculation of AltV. On the contrary, when a party leader or deputy is expelled or simply exits from a
party and then launches a new party, this latter has been included in the calculation of RegV. Moreover,
‘genuinely new parties’ – namely ‘parties that are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties,
have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members’ (Sikk 2005, 399) – clearly enter the calculation of RegV. These criteria are also used, among others, by Dassonneville (2015), Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2017), Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017), and, also for the study of Central and Eastern European countries, by Lane and Ersson (2007), Ersson (2012) and Emanuele, Chiaramonte and Soare (2018). As underlined by Sikk (2005, 393–394), this approach is conservative, in the sense that it underestimates voters’ mobility but it ‘seems to better balance shortcomings and merits’ with respect to alternative approaches. Furthermore, according to Ersson (2012, 4), this approach ‘is the least troublesome one’.¹

As regards thresholds, for the calculation of TV and its internal components, whenever data were available, all parties’ scores between elections have been confronted. In the few cases where disaggregated data of the ‘Others’ category were unavailable (see notes on individual countries below) the residual category of ‘Others’ has been confronted across subsequent elections and the resulting volatility has been included in OthV. As in Emanuele (2015), we have set a threshold of 1% of the national share for parties in order to be included in the calculation of either RegV or AltV. The rationale behind this logic is that when a party casts 1% or more, it is already considered as a relevant component of the party system while a vote shift from, say, 1.9% to 2.1% is only considered as an alteration in the strength of an established party, devoid of any regeneration for the party system. We believe that, while any threshold could be considered arbitrary and has its own trade-offs, to not set any threshold would be even more distorting for the purpose of calculating the extent to which a party system is undergoing a regeneration. Therefore, a threshold is necessary to set a qualitative distinction between parties that produce a significant change within the system and parties that simply enter the election game.

Finally, once again following previous choices made by Emanuele (2015), Independents for which we do not have separate information have been treated as a unique ‘party’, but always included in OthV, so as to not inflate either RegV or AltV.

**Bloc volatility**

Introduced for the first time in the 1980s (Borre 1980; Mair 1983; Bartolini 1986), and later systematically developed and empirically explored by Bartolini and Mair (1990), the concept of ‘bloc’ volatility refers to the net change in the aggregate vote share for all parties included in a given ‘bloc’, based on theoretical considerations. For a long time, the predominance of the left-right conflict as the main dimension of electoral competition (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990) and the spread of the class cleavage in all Western European party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970; Bartolini 2000) led the literature to

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¹ For a further discussion on possible alternative methods for calculating electoral volatility, see Casal Bértola, Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2017). For a detailed literature review about what has to be considered a ‘new party’, see Emanuele and Chiaramonte (2018).
focus on bloc volatility as class bloc volatility. The concept of bloc, therefore, is intrinsically linked, at least in its origin, to the concept of cleavage, and specifically to that of class cleavage. However, from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint, the concept and the related measurement can be extended to cover different dimensions of competition that have the potential to create a divide within the electorate and among parties representing the two sides of a given conflict that has received a politicization. Based on the analysis of a large literature, resulting from both classical studies and recent contributions, our choice is to focus on the two main conflicts that are deemed to structure political and electoral competition in Europe today, namely the old class conflict and the rising demarcation conflict (see the following sections below).

From an empirical viewpoint, bloc volatility is nothing but an internal component of total volatility that measures the net aggregate vote switching between the two sides of a given bloc. The remaining part of electoral volatility, defined as Within-Bloc Volatility (WBV) is instead devoted to capture all vote shifts occurring within the two blocs and can be simply obtained by subtracting Bloc Volatility (BV) from Total Volatility (TV) (Bartolini and Mair 1990 [2007], 28–31). Hence, by definition, BV can range between 0 and TV but can never exceed TV. To calculate BV is sufficient to measure the net change – in absolute terms – in the aggregate vote share for the parties belonging to a given bloc (say, parties included in the class bloc) between two consecutive elections. This is because all the remaining parties are assumed to be part of the opposing bloc (i.e., the bourgeois bloc in the case of the class bloc).

**The class bloc**

For the definition of the class bloc and the identification of parties included in such bloc we rely on Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Bartolini (1983; 2000). We include ‘those parties which are the historical product of the structuring of the working-class movement’ (Bartolini and Mair 1990 [2007], 46). Therefore, following these authors, we consider the historical communist, socialist, social democratic, and labor parties originally emerged to politicize the mobilization of the working class in Europe and represent it in the national political life. These historical parties (and their successors) have been systematically included in the Class Bloc, while parties of the ‘New Politics’ (Poguntke 1987; Kitschelt 1988; Müller-Rommel 1989), emphasizing issues like environmentalism, feminism, or civil rights have been always excluded. For 11 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom), Bartolini and Mair (1990 [2007], 285) and Bartolini (2000, 573–574) provide the full list of parties included in the Class Bloc up to the 1980s. These lists represented a useful starting point for our classification that, being based on the European Parliament elections, covers the period since 1979. Direct successors of class bloc parties included in these lists have generally entered our classification, with the only significant exception of right-wing splits from social democratic or labor parties (see later in this section). For the inclusion of potentially new
class bloc parties emerged in recent years in these 11 countries and for all the remaining countries covered by this dataset in the whole period under study (starting from the accession into the European Union), we have carefully considered all parties belonging to the communist, socialist, and social democratic party families in the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2019) and in the communist and socialist party families in the Comparative Manifesto Project Database (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2018). Then, by relying on specific literature on these parties and party-related sources, we have excluded those parties that did not fit our substantive (see above) or methodological criteria (see below).

As regards our methodological criteria, we have excluded from the calculation of the aggregate vote share of the Class Bloc parties that have never received 1% of the vote share in general elections. This choice was done to exclude extremely minor parties whose potential inclusion in the Class Bloc was hard to assess with a sufficient degree of precision given the scarce information available. Moreover, as concerns party continuity and change across time, class bloc parties changing name or symbol, merging or forming joint lists with other class bloc parties are obviously included in the Class Bloc. Conversely, in the case of splits or in the case of merge between a class bloc party and a non-class bloc party, choices become less straightforward. Generally speaking, we looked at the splinter party and included it in the Class bloc whenever it still maintained a clear communist, socialist, or social democratic programmatic profile (e.g., the case of Communist Refoundation Party in Italy in 1992). Conversely, ‘right-wing’ splits from Social democratic parties (e.g., the Movement of the Radicals of the Left from the Socialist Party in France in 1994) that have explicitly abandoned their former ideological references to social democracy, shifting their programmatic focus away from economic left issues and embracing liberal, radical, green, or ‘new politics’ ideological profiles, have been generally excluded from the Class Bloc. In the case of merge between a class bloc party and a non-class bloc party, the general rule we have followed is to consider the new party as part of the Class Bloc when the class bloc party was the largest predecessor (as in the case of the merge of Democrats of the Left and The Daisy into the Olive Tree List in Italy in 2004 and later into the Democratic Party in 2007). In all cases of non-class bloc splits from a class bloc party or mergers between class bloc and non-class bloc parties, following Bartolini and Mair (1990 [2007], 285–286), the total vote share of the non-class bloc party is counted in continuity with the original party for Class Bloc Volatility in the first election. This is also a consistent choice with the rules followed for the calculation of TV, so as to avoid the theoretically impossible case of BV exceeding TV. The same methodological rules apply also to the Demarcation Bloc (see the next section).

As a result of these selection, a total of 97 class bloc parties have contested the European Parliament elections since 1979 in the 28 EU-member countries (see Table 1).
### Table 1. Parties in the class bloc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Parties in the Class bloc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Austria; Communist Party of Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Communist Party; Workers' Party of Belgium; Francophone Socialist Party; Flemish Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Communist Party of Bulgaria; Alternative for Bulgarian Revival; Coalition for Bulgaria- Bulgarian Socialist Party; Bulgarian Social Democracy; Party of Bulgarian Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Croatian Labourists – Labour Party; Social Democratic Party of Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Progressive Party of Working People; Movement for Social Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; Czech Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Social Democrats; Left Socialists; Socialist People's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party; Estonian United Left Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Left Alliance; Social Democratic Party of Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Socialist Party; Revolutionary Communist League; Workers' Struggle; French Communist Party (Front de Gauche-Unbowed France); Unified Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany; Party of Democratic Socialism - LINKE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement; Democratic Left; Democratic Social Movement; Coalition of the Left-SYRIZA; Communist Party of Greece; Communist Party of Greece-Interior; Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party; Hungarian Workers' Party; Social Democratic Party; Democratic Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Labour Party; Workers’ Party; Socialist Party; People Before Profit Alliance; Democratic Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Italian Communist Party-Democratic Party of the Left-Democrats of the Left-Democratic Party; Italian Socialist Party; Italian Democratic Socialists; Italian Democratic Socialist Party; Proletarian Democracy; Communist Refoundation Party; Party of the Italian Communists; Proletarian Unity Party; Left, Ecology and Freedom; Other Europe with Tsipras; The Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Socialist Party; Social Democratic Workers' Party; Harmony; Social Democratic Welfare Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Socialist Workers' Party; Communist Party of Luxembourg; Independent Socialists; The Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Labour Party; Socialist Party; Pacifist Socialist Party; Communist Party of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Social Democracy of Poland; Democratic Left Alliance; Labour Union; Razem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Socialist Party; Unified Democratic Coalition; Bloc of the Left; Portuguese Workers Communist Party; Workers Party of Socialist Unity; Revolutionary Socialist Party; Popular Democratic Union; Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Romanian Socialist Party; Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Communist Party of Slovakia; Party of the Democratic Left; Direction-Social Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>United Left-The Left; United List-Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Spanish Socialist Workers Party; United Left; Workers' Party of Spain-Communist Unity Board; Podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party; Left Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The demarcation bloc**

Besides the class cleavage, a new transnational cleavage has been deemed to be structuring political conflict in Europe. In a series of studies, Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008; 2012) have widely supported the idea of the emergence of a new ‘demarcation’ vs ‘integration’ cleavage, pitting the ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalization against each other. In particular, Kriesi et al. (2008) identify globalization as the driving force of social and political change in the last decades, thus generating new sources of differentiation and inequalities in national communities. ‘Likely winners of globalization include entrepreneurs and qualified
employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens [...on the contrary.] losers of globalization, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community’ (Kriesi et al. 2008, 8).

As long as citizens are capable to recognize the differences between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and articulate their political preferences according to their conditions, political parties respond strategically. New challenger parties emerge and align on one of the two opposite poles, mobilizing voters on this new dimension of political conflict and pushing other (usually mainstream) parties to respond (Kriesi 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2017).

Not differently, Hooghe and Marks (2017) in their analysis of cleavage politics, understand globalization as the external shock which is at the base of radical societal changes, leading to the formation of a new transnational cleavage revolving around political opposition against European integration and immigration (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 1). These changes are considered as crucial sources of dynamism within party systems, as challenger parties with distinctive profiles on the new cleavage emerge and respond to political demands coming from voters. In this dynamic process, a new cleavage congeals, restructuring the space of political competition.

How is this new cleavage structured? Different scholars have articulated the idea of this new emerging cleavage adopting a vast array of definitions and conceptualizations. Among the others, we record the following: demarcation-integration (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012); GAL-TAN (Hooghe et al. 2002); libertarian/universalistic-traditionalist/communitarian (Bornschier 2010); cosmopolitan-communitarian or parochial (Teney et al. 2014; De Vries 2018; Strijbis, Helmer and de Wilde 2018); universalism-particularism (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). Despite the growing number of definitions used to refer to this new cleavage, there is a general consensus in considering this new line of political conflict as organized along two dimensions: an economic and a cultural dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008, 11). From an economic point of view, the demarcation vs integration cleavage contrasts positions supporting liberal, market-oriented positions with protectionist positions, aiming at defending national markets from international competition. From a cultural perspective, ‘a universalist, multiculturalist or cosmopolitan position is opposing a position in favor of protecting the national culture and citizenship in its civic, political and social sense’ (Kriesi et al. 2008, 11). In other words, on the economic side, pro-state and protectionist stances are opposed to pro-market orientations; on the cultural side, anti-EU and anti-immigration positions collide with pro-EU and multicultural stances (Kriesi et al. 2008).

We grounded our definition of the demarcation bloc based on this literature and we classified parties as either belonging to demarcation bloc or not accordingly. To this scope, we rely on two criteria: a quantitative and a qualitative one. Both are detailed in the following.
**Quantitative criteria**

In order to identify the political parties belonging to the demarcation bloc, we relied on the data provided by the CMP (Volkens et al. 2018), starting from the first European Parliament election (1979) until the most recent general election in each of the 28 EU member states. WE preferred the CMP to the Euromanifesto Study (Schmitt et al. 2018) for the larger number of observations (party-year dyads) coded (632 against 347).

The dataset provides relevant information on the positioning of national political parties in each member state on different dimensions and allows us to identify which of these parties can be considered as part of what we label the demarcation bloc. In the CMP, these data are obtained based on the coding of party manifestos for each national general election. The methodology adopted – and widely validated (Budge and Pennings 2007; Volkens et al. 2009; Pennings 2011) – is based on content-analysis of party manifestos, which are broken down and parsed into quasi-sentences assigned to one of the 56 CMP macro-categories (i.e., issue categories). This procedure allows to measure the proportion of sentences and quasi-sentences that the party has dedicated to a given topic in every single election, thus measuring the party’s relative emphasis on each issue. Also, the dataset distinguishes between positive and negative mentions on the coded issues. For example, on immigration, for each party manifesto in any single election, the CMP reports the proportion of positive mentions (pro-immigration) and the proportion of negative mentions (anti-immigration) on the subject.

Coherently with the arguments developed previously, the inclusion of a party in the demarcation bloc is defined on the basis of two dimensions: economic and cultural. The economic dimension is captured by an item that measures the position of the party on free trade and open markets (\(per407=\)Support for the concept of free trade and open markets; \(per406=\)Favorable mentions of extending or maintaining the protection of internal markets). The cultural dimension is instead gauged by two items that measure each party’s pro-anti-EU positions (\(per108=\)Favorable mentions of European Community/Union in general; \(per110=\)Negative mentions of European Community/Union in general) and pro-anti-multicultural positions (\(per607=\)Favorable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies; \(per608 =\)Negative mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies). For each of the three items, we calculated the party’s position as the difference between the positive and the negative pole for each election. This value has been then weighted for the salience of the issue for each single party, obtained as the sum of the proportion of positive and negative mentions on each item.

- **Free trade and open markets:** \((per407-per406) \times (per407+per406)\)
- **Multiculturalism:** \((per607-per608) \times (per607+per608)\)
- **Pro-Anti EU:** \((per108-per110) \times (per108+per110)\)
This calculation yields an index ranging from negative values to positive values, with 0 indicating a neutral party’s position on the issue. The indexes are calculated so that more negative values indicate that the party tends to lean towards the demarcation pole in a stronger way.

Once a score has been calculated on these three items for each party in each election, we averaged them separately for the whole period of time taken into account (i.e. 1979-2019). This procedure allowed us to obtain a unique score for each of the three items associated with any single party. Finally, a mean of the means is calculated for the three items to get a synthetic measure of party position and salience on the demarcation-integration cleavage.

In order to identify the political parties belonging to demarcation bloc, we adopted a conservative approach. Specifically, a party is deemed to be part of the demarcation bloc if and only if:

1) At least two out of the three items taken into account in this study (i.e. multiculturalism, free trade, Europeanism) have a negative score;
2) The average score of the three items (i.e. the mean of the means of the three items) is negative.

The procedure results in a list of 49 parties identified as part of the demarcation bloc.

Qualitative assessment

The 49 political parties identified as part of the demarcation bloc based on the CMP data have been further analyzed qualitatively. To do so, we relied on secondary sources and, more generally, on relevant scholarly literature. This further step in our construction of the demarcation bloc has served as a robustness check of the quantitative procedure.

A thorough analysis of each party included in the demarcation bloc confirmed the robustness and consistency of the data produced by the CMP. However, few exceptions are worth to be noticed. Based on our quantitative analysis of the CMP data, the Social Democratic Party in Denmark, the European Party in Cyprus, and the River in Greece are classified as belonging to the demarcation bloc. However, our qualitative assessment points to a misclassification issue, leading us to exclude these parties from the demarcation bloc. For each of these three parties, we detail the reasons underpinning our choice.

The most problematic case is the Danish Social Democratic Party. Traditionally, the Social Democratic Party has been a reformist party, oriented to compromise, and a ‘defender of refugee immigration and (some sort of) multiculturalism’ (Rydgren 2004, 494). However, in recent times, the party has shifted its policy positions (especially on immigration), adopting more restrictive stances on both immigration and multiculturalism (Rydgren 2004; Green Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Bale et al. 2009). This change in the party’s positions is largely due to the politicization of immigration especially by radical and mainstream right-wing parties during the 1990s (Bale et al. 2009). To the politicization strategies of these
parties, the Social Democratic Party first responded trying to downplay the issue, but as the issue remained salient in the political debate, it started moving towards more restrictive positions and adopting postures which have become less distinguishable to those hold by right-wing political parties (Bale et al. 2009; Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2002). However, this transformation was highly divisive both among party elites and voters, and in fact resulted in an unclear position (Green Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008, 623), disorientation (Karpantschof 2003: 8, cit. in Rydgren 2004), ‘confusion and frustration – and a weakening position making the party unable, or unwilling, to present strong alternative frames, or counter-frames, of how to define social problems in contemporary Denmark’ (Rydgren 2004, 497). This fragmentation in the party’s positions led the party to the inability of articulating a credible stance on the issue. This is, at least partially, due to the mainstream nature of the party, which has tried to adapt its policy positions on immigration and multiculturalism when these issues have become increasingly salient for party competition. In doing so, the party has contributed to the depoliticization of socio-economic politics (on which social-democrats had a competitive advantage over their competitors) and the politicization of a socio-cultural dimension of political conflict (on which right-wing parties are more likely to be rewarded) (Rydgren 2004). This strategy was not electorally rewarding and indeed contributed to alienate the traditional social-democratic electorate, a clue that restrictive positions on immigration and multiculturalism were not part of the traditional political discourse of this party. Based on these analyses, we decided to exclude the Social Democrats from the demarcation bloc.

The European Party in Cyprus is also a problematic case. Formed in 2005 by New Horizons and dissidents from DISY (Agapiou-Josephides 2011), the party was characterized by a strong nationalist component (Katsourides 2013; Sepos 2008). The nationalist platform was fundamentally anchored to the specific condition of the country and to the conflict with Turkey (which occupied the northern part of the island in 1974) (Katsourides 2013; Faustman 2008). However, the party held a conventional right-wing position (both on economic and socio-cultural issues) and a clear pro-Europeanist posture – convinced that the Cyprus question should be resolved on the basis of a European solution (Agapiou-Josephides 2011; Christophorou 2007; Sepos 2008). Furthermore, the location of the party at European level gives us a further clue on its nature: throughout its life, the party was indeed a member of the European Democratic Party, a moderate European party committed to promote further integration of the EU (Agapiou-Josephides 2011). Based on these insights, the European Party does not match the profile of a demarcation party, thus it has been excluded from the demarcation bloc.

Finally, our preliminary analyses included The River in Greece in the demarcation bloc. However, our qualitative analysis led us to exclude this party. The River is in fact unanimously recognized as a centrist (Rori 2016, 1333; Vasilopoulou 2018, 318), reformist (Rori 2016, 1327), and pro-European party (Rori 2016; Tsebelis 2016; Vasilopoulou 2018).
The 2019 European Parliament elections and the entrance of new parties in the demarcation bloc

New political parties have entered in the computation of the volatility for the demarcation bloc after the European Parliament elections of 2019. These parties have contested the EP elections for the first time in 2019 (or, alternatively, have become politically relevant in these last elections) and their manifestos are not covered by the CMP dataset that we used as our main reference to classify political parties in the demarcation bloc. All the new parties which have run in the last EP elections have undergone a qualitative screening based on scientific literature and secondary sources. This review process led us to include the following parties in the demarcation bloc:

Greek Solution (Greece): The Greek Solution was founded in 2016 by Kyriakos Velopoulos, a former member of LAOS. In journalistic reports the party is identified as a radical right-wing party, Eurosceptic, traditionalist, pro-Russian and opposed to the deal on Macedonia. In the official website of the party, it is defined as ‘a patriotic and social alliance’ with the aim of strengthening and defending ‘the national interest’. The party has assumed critical positions towards immigration, considered as ‘a risk for the social and economic cohesion of the country’, potentially capable of undermine the stability of the nation. ‘National pride, national identity and national dignity’ are central words in the party's rhetoric.

Our Homeland Movement (Hungary): The party was formed by the former vice-president of Jobbik (already included in the demarcation bloc), in open conflict with the party leadership (accused of betraying the ‘national cause’). From what we read on the official website of the party, Our Homeland has taken a very critical position towards the European Union and its ‘bureaucrats’. The EU is seen as responsible ‘for uniformizing and eliminating the traditional national communities by applying more and more shameless tools masked as legal ones’ and it is deemed to privilege ‘the interests of multinational companies and financial groups’ which facilitate the colonization of the countries of the periphery. In economic terms, the party strongly opposes the interests of multinational companies and widely support ‘the implementation of a self-sustainable economy’, the protection of local products, and the strengthening of local markets. As for immigration, it is considered as a threat for Hungarian culture and security: ‘migration of a population of a different culture is threatening entire Europe and Europe with a mixed population is totally unacceptable.’ The party also expresses harsh positions towards humanitarian visa, considered as a way for illegal immigrants to enter the EU: ‘Any efforts made at borders would be

3 See: https://elliniki-lisi.gr/# (last accessed 19/06/2019).
5 See: https://mihazank.hu/our-homelands-europe/ (last accessed 19/06/2019).
futile if we accepted them, since these false immigrants, who deceptively declare themselves as victims of discrimination on grounds of sex, could enter the EU as persons eligible for humanitarian visa. It is not acceptable that legalizing migration is the solution instead of protecting the borders more effectively.

*Kukiz’15 (Poland):* Kukiz’15 is a political movement founded in 2015. Named after its leader, the former-rock star Paweł Kukiz, the party run in the national elections for the first time in 2015 by adopting a highly critical electoral platform against the Civic Platform (PO)-Polish Peasant Party (PSL) government and advocating for a first-past-the post electoral system (Markowski, 2016, 1316). It is unanimously considered as a far-right party (Markowski, 2016; Fomina and Kucharczyk, 2016; Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier, 2016), anti-European, xenophobic, populist and strongly anti-elitist (Markowski, 2016; Fomina and Kucharczyk, 2016; Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier, 2016). Moreover, it fully supports economic nationalism (Markowski, 2016). Although the party’s programmatic platform has not always been consistent over time (Markowski, 2016; Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier, 2016), the ideological profile of the party can be considered as very similar to that of PiS – already included in the demarcation bloc (Markowski, 2016).

*Brexit Party (United Kingdom):* The Brexit Party was formed at the beginning of 2019 with the goal of accelerating the United Kingdom’s exit process from the European Union. Led by the former UKIP leader Nigel Farage, the party focused its electoral campaign for the European Parliament elections on a single issue (Brexit), refusing to publish any party manifesto program before the vote (Smets, 2019). However, the party clearly appears as an anti-establishment, populist, and challenger party (Goodwin, 2019; Stafford, 2019), strongly advocating for independence and self-government. Furthermore, from the ideological and programmatic viewpoints, the Brexit Party is close to the UKIP – already included in the demarcation bloc.

*Vox (Spain):* Contrary to the other parties considered in this section, Vox run in the European elections also in 2014. At that time the party obtained a rather meager electoral performance (1.6%) and was outside the scientific literature’s radar and the CMP database. In recent years, the party has grown considerably, obtaining unexpected electoral performances and public visibility (the party won 6.2% of votes in the EP elections of 2019). Moreover, the party has consolidated its political identity, clarifying its positions on different policy areas (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). From this point of view, Vox represents an exceptional case in our analysis: from a situation of electoral irrelevance, the party has now become an important player on the Spanish political scene, as well as a party represented within the European Parliament. Unfortunately, at the time of the release of this Codebook (June 2019), the Vox party manifesto is not covered by the CMP yet, thus we assessed its position based on a qualitative assessment.
Vox is generally considered to be a party with a strong right-wing, authoritarian ideological connotation; nationalist, anti-immigration (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019), and rather critical towards the European Union.\(^6\) It is equated with the French National Front and Alternative for Germany – both included in the demarcation bloc in our dataset. All this considered, we decided to include the party in the demarcation bloc.

As a result of our qualitative screening, we finally included 51 political parties in the demarcation bloc across the 28 European Union Member States (see Table 2).

Table 2. Parties in the demarcation bloc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Parties in the Demarcation bloc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Alliance for the Future of Austria; Austrian Freedom Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Union Attack; National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria; IMRO-Bulgarian National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia; Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; Dawn of Direct Democracy-Freedom and Direct Democracy; Civic Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Danish People’s Party; Progress Party; Socialist People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conservative People’s Party of Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>True Finns; Christian Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Front; Unholy France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alternative for Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece; Popular Orthodox Rally; Coalition of the Left-SYRIZA; Greek Solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jobbik; Our Homeland Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Northern League; Brothers of Italy - National Centre-right; New Italian Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Communist Party of Luxembourg; Alternative Democratic Reform Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Party of Freedom; Socialist Party; 50Plus; Reformed Political Party; Party for the Animals; Reformed Political League; Pacifist Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>League of Polish Families; Law and Justice; Kukiz’15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Unified Democratic Coalition; Popular Democratic Union; Democratic Movement; People-Animals Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kotleho People’s Party Our Slovakia; Slovak National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Vox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats; Left Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party; Brexit Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on individual countries

Austria
In 1999, The Neutrals disappear (RegV) and the Christian Social Alliance – Karl Habsburg's List emerges (RegV). In 2004, Liberal Forum and the Christian Social Alliance – Karl Habsburg’s List disappear (RegV), while Hans-Peter Martin's List emerges (RegV). In 2009, Hans-Peter Martin’s List disappears (RegV) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) is a split from the FPÖ (AltV). In 2014, EU-STOP and NEOS – The New Austria (compared to Young Liberals [JULIS] in 2009) emerges (RegV). Hans-Peter Martin's and BZÖ disappear (RegV). Moreover, Europe Different (ANDERS) (compared to the Communist Party of Austria [KPÖ] in 2009) emerges (RegV). Furthermore, The Reform Conservatives (REKOS) has been founded by a former BZÖ member who had been expelled from the party: hence, it has been considered as new party (RegV). In 2019, EU-STOP, ANDERS, and REKOS disappear (RegV), while Europe (Peter Pilz List) splits from the Greens (AltV);

Belgium
In 1979 and 1984 we sum the percentages obtained by the Walloon and the Flemish wings of the Communist Party of Belgium (KPB/CPB) (which, until 1989, contested elections as a unitary party). In 1984, the Flemish Bloc (VB) is considered as a split from People’s Union (VU) (AltV), while the Democratic Front of the Francophones (FDF) is jointly considered with the Walloon Liberal Party-European Liberal Party (PLW-PLE) (AltV), given this latter includes the Walloon Rally (RW) which contested the 1979 European election with the FDF. In 1989, Regebo is a joint list including the Socialist Workers Party-Revolutionary Workers League (SAP-RAL) and the KPB, the Flemish split from the KPB/CPB (which was above 1% in 1984, hence RegV). In 1994, the National Front (FN) emerges (RegV), as well as Growing Old in Dignity (WOW) (RegV). In 1999, VIVANT emerges (RegV). In 2004, the Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V) and New Flemish Alliance (N-VA, the successor of the VU) form a joint list (AltV), while the Francophone Christian Democrats (CDF) are considered with the Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH) (AltV), given they are a split from the predecessor of the CDH, the Christian Social Party (PSC). In 2009, the Workers Party of Belgium (PTB/PVDA) emerges (RegV), while the Social Liberal Party (SLP) is considered with the N-VA (AltV), given it is a split from this latter. In 2014, List Dedecker (LDD) and the FN disappear (RegV), while Belgians, Rise Up! (DLB) emerges (RegV). In 2019, DLB disappears (RegV).

Bulgaria
In 2009, the Central Electoral Commission of Bulgaria reports 8 votes less than the sum of the votes gained by each party as the total valid votes for the election. We relied on the absolute votes got by each party (http://izboripec.bta.bg/). In 2009, the Blue Coalition (SK) is considered as a merge among Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB), United Agrarians (former ZNS), Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP – running in 2007 with DSB) and Radical Democratic Party in Bulgaria (AltV); moreover, the Liberal Initiative for Democratic European Development (LiDER) and the Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO) emerge (RegV) (Spirova 2010, Kolarova and Spirova 2010). In 2014, the Reformist Bloc is composed by Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB), Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), People’s Party Freedom and Dignity (a splinter party of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms), Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (split of United Agrarians) and Bulgarian New Democracy (AltV). The coalition Bulgarian Without Censorship (BBT) is composed by Bulgarian without Censorship (now Bulgaria Reloaded), Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO), BNU and Movement ‘Gergyovden’ (AltV). Still in 2014, the party People Voice emerges and the NDSV disappears (RegV) (Spirova 2015). In 2019, the 3% of voters supported the option ‘None of the Above’ (NOTA – Yordanova, 2019). However, these votes have been excluded from the total of valid votes. The coalition Democratic Bulgaria is formed by Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria and the Movement Yes Bulgaria, including candidates from the Greens (AltV). The Alternative for Bulgarian Revival leads the Coalition for Bulgaria that falls below the 1% threshold (RegV); the same occurs for the party People’s Voice (RegV). The party Volya and the coalition The Way to the Young (NDSV and New Times) emerge as new parties (RegV).

Cyprus
In 2009, the European Party (EVROKO) is considered as the successor of For Europe (GTE) and New Horizons (NO) (AltV). Moreover, in 2009, the United Democrats-KPE-European Cyprus disappears (RegV), while the Ecological and Environmental Movement (CPC) emerges (RegV). In 2014, the Citizens’ Alliance (SP) and National People’s Front (ELAM) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 2014, Message of Hope (ME) emerges (RegV). In 2019, ME disappears (RegV) while Jasmine Movement (KG) emerges (RegV). Moreover, in 2019, DiSY and the Democratic Party (DIKO) have been considered in continuity between 2014 and 2019 as EVROKO split from DISY and merged into Solidarity, which run into DIKO (AltV). Furthermore, Democratic Front (DiPa) splits from DIKO (AltV). In addition, in 2019, Green Party (KOP) split from Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) and merges into SP (AltV).

Croatia
In 2013, the list ‘Voters' group – Ivan Jakovčić’ is treated as a party and not as an individual candidate, since Jakovčić is leader of the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS), which is an antecedent of the Kukuriku
coalition running in 2014. In 2019, the coaliotional arrangement between parties changed significantly from 2014, so that new coalitions formed including parties that were in different coalitions in 2014. To assess volatility, the following party groupings were considered. 2014: HDZ coalition (HDZ + HSS + HSP AS + BUZ) + Kukuriku coalition (SDP + HNS–LD + IDS + HSU + SDSS) + Alliance for Croatia (HDSSB + HSP + Hrast + HZ–A + HSS) + Croatian Labourists–Labour Party (CL–LP). 2019: HDZ + SDP + Croatian Sovereignists (Hrast + HKS + HSP AS + UHD) + Amsterdam Coalition (HSS + GLAS + IDS + HSU + PGS + D + CL–LP) + Independents for Croatia & Croatian Party of Rights (NHR + HSP) + Croatian People's Party & Liberal Democrats (HNS + LD). Moreover, the party Human Shield (ŽZ) in 2019 was formerly called Alliance for Change (SP) (AltV).

Czech Republic

In 2009 EP Election Sovereignty has run on a ticket with the Party of Common Sense (RegV). The European Democratic Party is considered as a splinter party of the SNK European Democrats (AltV). The Party of Free Citizens (SVOBODNI) and Public Affairs (VV), at their first participation in an EP election, are counted as new parties (RegV). The list Mayor and Independents (STAN) is composed by ANeO, Club of Committed Non-party members (KAN), Independent Mayors, Labor Party, US-DEU (ULD in 2004) and Party for Open Society (AltV). The Independent Democrats (NEZDEM) breaks up and fall below the relevance (RegV) (Linek and Lacina 2010). In 2014, ANO2011 is considered a new party (RegV). The party TOP09, running on a ticket with STAN, emerges as a split within Christian and Democratic Union-People's Party (KDU-CSL). At the same time, ANeO and KAN – running with STAN in 2009 – presented their own lists in 2014. Thu, in 2014 STAN and KDU-CSL are compared with the ticket TOP09-STAN, KDU-CSL, ANeO, and KAN. The Pirate Party is considered a new party (RegV) and the European Democratic Party, SNK-ED and VV fall below the relevance threshold (RegV). In 2019, the coalition among STAN and TOP09 includes also Green Party and Liberal-Environmental Party (AltV). The list of the KDU-CSL includes the SNK and the Czech Crown (AltV). The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia includes the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Party of Democratic Socialism (AltV). The party Voice is considered a split of ANO2011 (AltV). The list No To Brussels (formed by the Party of Common Sense and National Democracy) and the party Svobodni (FREE) disappear (RegV). Contextually, the list ‘Yes, we will troll the EuroParliament’ (EUTROLL) emerges as a new party (RegV).

Denmark

In 1979 and 1984, ‘Others’ (0.5% and 2.1% respectively) are not disaggregated (OthV). In 1984, the Justice Party of Denmark (RS) disappears (RegV). In 1989, the Left Socialists (VS) disappears (RegV). In 1994, the Centre Democrats (CD) disappears (RegV), while the sum of votes by People’s Movement
against the EU (N) and June Movement (J) in 1994 is compared to the votes by People's Movement Against the EEC (N) (AltV), given J is a split from People's Movement Against the EU. In 1999, CD re-emerges (RegV) and the sum of votes by the People's Party (DF) and the Progress Party (FP) in 1999 is compared to the votes by FP in 1994 (AltV), given DF is a split from FP. In 2009, the Christian Democrats (KFP) disappears (RegV). In 2014, the Liberal Alliance (LA) emerges (RegV). In 2019, Red-Green Alliance and The Alternative emerge (RegV).

Estonia

In June 2008, the Estonian Left Party (ESDTP, since December 2004 EVP) merged with the Constitution Party to form the Estonian United Left Party (EÜP), hence EÜP is considered as part of the left bloc in 2004. Martin Helme in 2004 and in 2009 ran as an independent candidate. However, from 2008 to 2011 he was leader of the Estonian Patriotic Movement (ERL), founded in 2006, which since 2012 merged with the party People's Union (RL) to form the Conservative People's Party (EKRE). Moreover, in 2014, Helme was leader in the EKRE's list for the EUP elections. For these reasons, Martin Helme is considered as an independent candidate between 2004 and 2009 (OthV), but as an antecedent of EKRE between 2009 and 2014 (AltV). In 2019, Estonia 200 (E200) and Greens (EER) emerge (RegV).

Finland

In 1999, the Ecological Party (KIPU) emerges (RegV). In 2004, KIPU disappears (RegV). In 2009, True Finns (PS) emerges (RegV).

France

In 1984, Employment, Equality, Europe (EEE) and French Union for the Euro-right (UFEU) disappear (RegV), while the National Front (FN) and Succeed Europe (RE) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 1984, the Union for French Democracy (UDF) and Rally for the Republic (RPR) presented a joint list, and its result is compared to the sum of the votes obtained by UDF and RPR in 1979 (AltV). Furthermore, The Greens-Europe Ecology (Verts) is considered in continuity with Europe Ecology (EE) in 1979 (AltV). Finally, in 1984, the Radical Ecologist Union for the United States of Europe (ERE) is a joint list of ecologists, Radical Movement of the Left (MRG) and the Centrist Radical Union (UCR, whose leader was a former member of the Radical Party [PRAD]), and is jointly considered with the Socialist Party (PS) (AltV). In 1989, RE disappears (RegV), while Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Traditions (CPNT) and the Apolitical List for the Protection of Animals and the Environment (PAE) emerge (RegV). Then, in 1989, given the MRG presented a joint list with the PS, its result is compared to the sum of the votes obtained by PS and ERE in 1984 (AltV). Finally, in 1989, the Centre for Europe (CDS) is considered as a split from the UDF, and the result of the CDS and the joint list UDF-RPR is compared to the result of UDF-
RPR in 1984 (AltV). In 1994, PAE disappears (RegV), while Majority for Another Europe (MAE), Generation Ecology for Europe (GE), Europe Begins at Sarajevo emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 1994, the CDS had rejoined the UDF, and the result of the joint list UDF-RPR is compared to the result UDF-RPR and CDS in 1989 (AltV). Moreover, in 1994, MRG and Other Politics (Movement of Citizens) (MDC) splits from the PS list (AltV). In 1999, GE and Europe Begins at Sarajevo disappear (RegV), while the National Republican Movement (MNR), the Rally of French Taxpayers (RCF) and Fight for Employment (USQJ) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 1999, the result of the joint list formed by PS, Radical Party of the Left (PRG, considered as the successor of the MRG), and the MDC is compared to those by PS, MRG and MDC in 1994. Furthermore, in 1999, the result of the joint list formed by the Rally for France (RPF, a split from the RPR) and the Movement for France (MPF, considered in continuity with the MAE), the UDF list, and the joint list between RPR and Liberal Democracy (DL) are compared to the results of the joint list UDF-RPR and the MAE in 1994 (AltV). Finally, in 1999, the result of the Independent Ecologist Movement (MEI) splits from the Greens (AltV). In 2004, USQJ, RCF, MEI, and MNR disappear (RegV). Moreover, in 2004 the result of Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) (formed by the RPR and a split from the UDF), and the UDF are compared to the results of RPR-DL and UDF in 1999 (AltV). Finally, in 2004, the PRG splits from the PS-PRG-MDC list in 1999 (AltV). In 2009, RPF disappears (RegV), while Arise the Republic (DLR) emerges (RegV). Then, in 2009, the result of the joint list formed by UMP, New Centre (NC, a split from UDF) and Modern Left (GM) is summed to that of Democratic Movement (MODEM, given it is the continuation of the UDF) and that of the National Centre of Independents and Peasants (CNI, considered as a split from the UMP) and compared to the sum of 2004 results of UMP, UDF, Cap21 (which joined MODEM after 2004), and the list by Michel Hunault (AltV). Furthermore, in 2009, the Left Front (FG) – formed by the French Communist Party (PCF), the Left party (PG, a split from the PS), and United Left (GU, a split from the Communist Revolutionary League [LCR]) – PS, New Anticapitalist Party (NPA, a split from Workers Struggle [LO]), LO, and The Communists (a split from the PCF) are compared to PS, the PCF, and the joint list LO-LCR in 2004 (AltV). Moreover, in 2009, FN and The Party of France (PDF, the successor of the National Republican Movement [MNR] and the House of Life and Freedoms [MVL], a split from the FN) are compared to FN and MNR in 2004 (AltV). Finally, in 2009, the Independent Ecologist Alliance (AEI) is a joint list of France from Below (LFDB) and MEI and its result is compared to those by LFDB and MEI in 2004 (AltV). In 2014, NPA disappears (RegV), while We Citizens (NOUC) emerges (RegV). Then, UMP (which includes Libertas – in turn formed by MPF and CPNT), the joint list Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI), MODEM (which includes the Radical Party, the Centrist Alliance, and the NC, which exited from UMP in 2014 and also includes Liberal Alternative [AL]), and Citizen Europe (EC, which is continuity with Cap21, in turn split from MODEM) are compared to the 2009 results of the UMP-NC-GM list, MODEM, Libertas, and AL (AltV). Furthermore, in 2014, New Deal
(ND) splits from PS (AltV). In 2019, NOUC and LO disappear (RegV), while Animalist Party (PA), Ecology Urgency (UE), and Popular Republican Union (UPR) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 2019, MODEM splits from UDI and joins *En Marche* (LAREM) (AltV); AEI and Regions and People with Solidarity (PNB) merge into EELV (AltV); NC splits UDI and joins The Republican (LR) (AltV); ND merges into PS while Generation.s (GENS) splits from it (AltV). Furthermore, in 2019, FG splits into Unbowed France (FI) and PCF (AltV). Finally, in 2019, The Patriots (LESP) splits from FN. The data source for French elections between 1979 and 2014 is https://www.france-politique.fr/

**Germany**

In 1984, the Peace List (formed by the German Communist Party [DKP] and the German Peace Union) emerges (RegV), while the Ecologic Democratic Party (ÖDP), considered as the successor of the Green Action Future (GAZ), is considered in continuity with the Greens (GRÜNEN) (AltV), given GAZ took part in the 1979 European election in the Green list. In 1989, the Republicans (REP) and the German People’s Union (DVU) emerge (RegV). In 1994, The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) emerges (RegV), as well as the Confederation of Free Citizens (BFB) (RegV), while the National Democratic Party (NPD), considered in continuity with the DVU in 1989, disappears (RegV). In 1999, the BFB disappears (RegV). In 2004, the Party Human Environmental Animal Protection (TIERSCHUTZPARTEI), the Grays – Gray Panthers (GRAU), and the Family Party of Germany (FD) emerge (RegV). In 2009, the Free Voters (FW) emerge (RegV), while FD and GRAU disappear (RegV). In 2014, Alternative for Germany (AFD), the Pirate Party (PIRATEN) and the NPD emerge (RegV), while the REP disappear (RegV). In 2019, NPD and PIRATEN disappears (RegV) while The Party emerges (RegV).

**Greece**

In 1994 and 1999, ‘Others’ (0.4% and 0.9% respectively) are not disaggregated (OthV). In 1984, the National Political Union (EPEN) emerges (RegV), while the Party of Democratic Socialism (KDS), the Christian Democracy (CD), the Liberal Party (KF), the Union of Democratic Centre (EDK), the Progressive Party (KP) disappear (RegV). Moreover, in 1984, the Fighting Socialist Party (ASKE) splits from PASOK (AltV). In 1989, Alternative Ecologists (OE) and Democratic Ecological Movement emerge (RegV). Furthermore, in 1989, Democratic Renewal (DIANA) splits from ND (AltV). Then, in 1989, the result of the Coalition of the Left and Progress’ result (SYN), along with that of Communist Party of Greece (KKE) – Renewing Left is compared to the results of KKE and the KKE-Interior in 1984, given these two latter took part in the SYN list in 1989 (AltV). In 1994, the Democratic Ecological Movement, EPEN, and OE disappear (RegV), while the Union of Centrists (EK) emerges (RegV). Moreover, in 1994, the Greek Socialist Party merges into PASOK and Political Spring (PA) splits from ND (AltV). In 1994, KKE splits from SYN (AltV). In 1999, EPEN and EK disappear (RegV), while The
Liberals emerges (RegV). Moreover, in 1999, the Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI) splits from PASOK (AltV). Furthermore, in 1999, DIANA merges into PA (AltV). In 2004, DIKKI and The Liberals disappear (RegV), while the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) emerges (RegV) and is considered in continuity with the Party of Hellenism (HP). Moreover, in 2004, PA merges into ND (AltV). Furthermore, in 2004, Women for Another Europe splits from SYN (AltV). In 2009, the Ecologist Greens (OP), the Panhellenic Macedonian Front (PAMME), and the Party of Greek Hunters (KEK) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 2009, the Hellenic Front merges into LAOS (AltV) and Women for Another Europe merges into SYRIZA (continuation of SYN) (AltV). In 2014, PAMME, KEK, and OP disappear (RegV), while Golden Dawn (XA), The River (POTAMI), Independent Greeks (ANEL), Greek European Citizens (EEP), Union for the Homeland and the People (EPP) emerge (RegV). Furthermore, in 2014, the Democratic Left (DIMAR) splits from SYN (AltV). In 2019, Greek Solution (EL), European Realistic Disobedience Front (Diem25), Course of Freedom (PE), Greece, and the Other Way (OAD) emerge, while EK reemerges (RegV). Moreover, in 2019, ANEL, EEP, and EPP disappear (RegV). DIMAR merges into SYRIZA, while Popular Unity (LAE) splits from it and runs together with the Pirate Party, which, in turn, had run with the OP list in 2014 (AltV).

The data source until 1994 is the Archivio Eleotor de la Comunitat Valenciana (http://www.argos.gva.es/ahe/pls/argos_elec/DMEDB_elecPaises.informeElec?aVPaisId=GR&aVId=GR&cApeId=GR), while from 1999 onwards, the Greek Ministry of Interior.

Hungary

In 2009, the Hungarian Workers’ Party (WP), running in 2004, splits into the Hungarian Communist Workers’ Party (MKMP) and the Workers’ Party of Hungary in 2009 (AltV). In 2014, the list Dialogue for Hungary (PM), founded by two MPs who left the party Politics Can Be Different (LMP), ran in a coalition with Together 2014 (E14) (RegV); Democratic Coalition (DK) splits from the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) (AltV). In 2019, Two-tailed Dog Party (MKKP) emerge (RegV), while Our Homeland Movement (MHM) splits from Jobbik (AltV). Moreover, in 2019, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) ran in a coalition with Dialogue for Hungary (PM), which in 2014 was in a coalition together with Together 2014 (E14), hence the joint list MSZP-PM was regarded as a merger of MSZP and E14-PM (AltV).

Ireland

Independents have been treated as a unique ‘party’ but always included in OthV, so as to not inflate either RegV or AltV. Ersson makes a different choice on this point, by treating them as a genuinely new party each time, thus overestimating its type ‘A’ volatility, which corresponds to RegV. In 1989, the Progressive Democrats (PD) emerge (RegV). In 1994, the Democratic Left (DL) is treated as a split from the Workers
Party (WP) (AltV). In 1999, the WP disappear. In 2004, the Socialist Party (SP) emerges. In 2009, Libertas emerges. In 2014, Direct Democracy Ireland (DDI) and People Before Profit Alliance (PBP) emerge (RegV), while Fis Nua is treated as a split from the Green Party (GP) (AltV). In 2019, Social Democrats (SD) emerge (RegV), while DDI disappears (RegV). Moreover, in 2019, the Solidarity-PBP list is in continuity with SP and PBP in 2014 (AltV). The data source for Irish elections is https://www.electionsireland.org.

**Italy**

Votes cast by Italians abroad excluded. In 1984, Proletarian Democracy (DP) emerges (RegV), while the Party of Proletarian Unity for Communism (PDUP) forms a joint list with the Italian Communist Party (PCI) (AltV). In 1989, the Federation of Green Lists and Lombard League – North Alliance emerge (RegV), while the Rainbow Greens are a split from the DP (AltV). In 1994, Forza Italia (FI) and The Network (La Rete) emerge (RegV), while the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Liberals (successor of the Italian Liberal Party [PLI]), and the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) disappear (RegV). Moreover, in 1994, the Italian Popular Party (PPI) and the Segni Pact (Patto Segni) are considered as successors of from Christian Democracy (DC) (AltV). Furthermore, in 1994, the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and the Communist Refoundation Party (RC) are compared with PCI and DP in 1994. In 1999, Italian Renewal – Dini (Rinnovamento Italiano) emerges (RegV). The Christian Democratic Centre (CCD) is considered as a split from FI in 1994 (AltV). Moreover, National Alliance (AN) and Segni Pact forms a joint list, while the Social Movement–Tricolor Flame (MS-FI) splits from AN (AltV). Furthermore, The Democrats (I Democratici) – a merge of, among others, Democratic Alternative (AD, which contested the 1994 election within the Italian Socialist Party [PSI] list) and The Network – the Italian Democratic Socialists (SDI) and the Socialist Party (PS), two successors of the PSI, are compared with the results of the PSI-AD and The Network in 1994 (AltV). Then, in 1999, the League Venetian Republic splits from LN (AltV). Moreover, in 1999 the Party of the Italian Communists (PDCI) splits from RC (AltV). Furthermore, in 1999, the United Christian Democrats (CDU) and the United Democrats for Europe (UDEUR, mainly a split from CDU) splits from PPI (AltV). In 2004, the United Socialists (Socialisti Uniti), Social Alternative (Alternativa Sociale), the Pensioners’ Party (Partito Pensionati) emerge (RegV), and Tricolor Flame disappears (RegV). Then, in 2004, the Olive Tree List (Uniti nell’Ulivo, a joint list of the Left Democrats [DS, Democratici di Sinistra] and The Daisy [La Margherita]) and the Occhetto – Di Pietro list (considered in continuity with the Democrats, given this latter included the party founded by Antonio di Pietro, Italy of the Values [Italia dei Valori], in 1999), are compared to the results of the DS, the Democrats, the PPI, the SDI, and Italian Renewal – Dini in 1999 (AltV). Furthermore, in 2004, AN, the Segni-Scognamiglio Pact (in continuity with the Segni Pact, which contested the 1999 election with AN), and the PRI-Liberal Sgarbi List are compared to AN-Segni Pact
and the PRI-Federation of the Liberals in 1999 (AltV). Furthermore, in 2004, the result of the Union of the Centre (UDC) is the result of the merge between CCD and CDU (AltV). In 2009, the UDEUR disappears (RegV), while the People of Freedoms (PDL) and New Force (FN, a split from AS, now included in the PDL list) are compared to the results of FI, AN, United Socialists (which were included in the PDL list in 2009), and AS (AltV). Moreover, in 2009, the Democratic Party (PD), Left and Freedom (SEL, a merge of splits from PD, RC, PDCI and Verdi), RC-PDCI-European Left, and Workers’ Communist Party (PCI, a split from RC) are compared to the sum of the results obtained in 2004 by Uniti nell’Ulivo, RC, PDCI, and Verdi (AltV). Furthermore, in 2009, UDC, The Right-Movement for the Autonomies – Partito Pensionati – Centre Alliance (a split from UDC) are compared to the results of UDC and Partito Pensionati in 2004 (AltV). In 2014, the Lista Marco Pannella – Emma Bonino, the list The Right-Movement for the Autonomies – Partito Pensionati – Centre Alliance, and IDV disappear (RegV), while the Five Star Movement (M5S) emerges (RegV). Moreover, in 2014, FI, New Centre-Right – UDC (NCD-UDC), and Brothers of Italy (all splits from the PDL) – National Alliance (FDI-AN) are compared to the results obtained by the PDL and UDC in 2009 (AltV). Furthermore, in 2014, the result of the list LN-Die Freiheitlichen-Stop Euro and I Change – Associative Movement for the Italians Abroad (Io Cambio – MAIE, as I Change is a split from LN) are compared to the results of LN and Liberaldemocrats-MAIE in 2009 (AltV). Moreover, in 2014, The Other Europe with Tsipras (a joint list of RC and Left Ecology and Freedom), European Greens – Green Italia (a split from SEL) are compared to the results obtained by RC-PDCI-European Left and SEL in 2009 (AltV). In 2019, More Europe (+EUR) emerges (RegV; considered in continuity with European Choice [SC] which was below 1% in 2014); Green Europe emerges (RegV); NCD-UDC (in continuity with People of Family-Popular Alternative in 2019) disappears (RegV). Moreover, in 2019, The Left is considered in continuity with Other Europe with Tsipras (AltV).

Latvia

In 2009, the National Harmony Party (TSP) merges with the Socialist Party (LSP) and the Social Democratic Union (SDP) to form Harmony Centre (SC), renamed as Harmony (SPDS) in the 2014 election (AltV). The Civic Union (PS), appearing in 2009, was founded in 2008 by former members of For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK (TB/LNNK) and New Era Party (JL) (AltV). Moreover, For Human Rights in United Latvia (PCTVL) was renamed as Latvian Russian Union (LKS) in 2014. In 2014, Unity is a merger between Civic Union (PS), New Era (JL), and Society for Political Change (SCP) (AltV); National Alliance is a merger between For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK (TB/LNNK) and All For Latvia! (VL) (AltV); finally, For Human Rights in United Latvia (PCTVL) was renamed as Latvian Russian Union (LKS). In 2019, the list Development/For! is considered as heir of the Latvian Development party (AltV).
**Lithuania**

Between 2004 and 2009, the party Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was renamed as Order and Justice (PTT); the party Liberal Movement (LRLS), founded by dissidents of the Liberal and Centre Union (LCS), is treated as a splinter (AltV). The National Resurrection Party (NRP) merged into the Liberal and Centre Union (LCS) in 2011 (AltV). Between 2009 and 2014, the Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (VNDS) was renamed as Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union. In 2019, the public election committees ‘Aušra Maldeikienė’s Train’, ‘President Rolandas Paksas' Movement’, ‘Vytautas Radžvilas: Recover the State’, ‘Strong Lithuania in United Europe’, and ‘Decisive Leap were considered as individual candidates (OthV). The party Lithuanian Freedom Union (LLS) is the merge of LCS and Homeland Revival and Perspective (YES) (AltV).

**Luxembourg**

In 1984, the Greens (GLEI-GAP) and the Independent Socialist Party (PSI) emerge (RegV), while the Alternative List (AL) disappears (RegV). In 1989, the Green List Ecological Initiative (GLEI) and the Green Alternative Party (GAP) are jointly considered and compared to the Greens (GLEI-GAP) in 1984 (AltV), given the former two parties are considered as a split of the Greens. Moreover, in 1989, the National Movement (LLNB) emerges (RegV), while the Independent Socialist Party (PSI) disappears (RegV). In 1994, the Greens (GLEI-GAP) are compared to GLEI and GAP in 1989 (AltV). Moreover, in 1994, the Action Committee for Democracy and Pensions Justice (ADR) and the Group for Luxembourgian Sovereignty (GLS) emerge (RegV). Then, in 1994, the Communist Party (KPL) is jointly considered with the New Left, given this latter is a merge of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (LCR) and a minority faction of the KPL, and they are compared with the LCR and the KPL in 1989 (AltV). In 1999, the National Movement (NB[LLNB]) and the GLS disappear (RegV), while the Green and Liberal Alliance (GAL) emerges (RegV); moreover, in 1999 the Left (DL) is a merge of the KPL and the New Left (AltV). In 2004, the KPL splits from DL (AltV). In 2009, the Citizens’ List (BL) emerges (RegV). In 2014, BL disappears (RegV), while the Pirate Party and the Party for Full Democracy (PID) emerge (RegV). In 2019, Volt emerges (RegV) while Party for Full Democracy joins the Pirate Party (AltV). Data source of Luxembourgish elections is CEVIPOL until the 1994 election (https://web.archive.org/web/20120217195817/http://dev.ulb.ac.be/cevipol/fr/elections_luxembourg_europeennes_1979.html); since then on it is the official electoral authority of the country (https://elections.public.lu).

**Malta**
Independents have been treated as a unique ‘party’ but always included in OthV, so as to not inflate either RegV or AltV. In 2004, Independents disappear (OthV), while Imperium Europa (IE) emerges (RegV). In 2019, Democratic Alternative disappears (RegV) and Democratic Party (founded in 2016 by a former Labour Party MP who left the Labour in 2015) emerges (RegV).

**Netherlands**

In 1984, the Centre Party (CP) and the European Greens emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 1984, the Green Progressive Accord (GPA) is a joint list of the Political Party of the Radicals (PPR), the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), and the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) (AltV). Furthermore, the Christian Union – Reformed Political Party (CU-SGP) is in continuity with the Reformed Political Party (SGP) and the Reformed Political League (GPV) in 1979 (AltV). In 1989, the European Greens and the Centre Party (CP) disappear (RegV). In 1994, the Greens (DG, considered in continuity with the Rainbow in 1989), the Socialist Party (PS), and the Centre Democrats (CD) emerge (RegV). In 1999, the DG and CD disappear (RegV). In 2004, Europe Transparent (ET), the Party for the Animals (PVDD), and the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) emerge (RegV). In 2009, ET and LPF disappear (RegV), while the Party for Freedom (PVV) emerges (RegV). In 2014, 50PLUS emerges (RegV). In 2019, Forum for Democracy (FvD) and Volt emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 2019, Denk splits from PvdA (AltV).

**Poland**

In 2009, the National Electoral Committee (NKWW) and the Polish initiative (IdP) disappear (RegV). ‘Agreement for the Future – CenterLeft’ (CL) is a coalition including Social Democracy of Poland, Democratic Party (Freedom Union in 2004) and Greens2004 (AltV). In 2014, The Congress of the New Right (NP) and Poland Together (PRJG) emerge (RegV). The founder of NP, Korwin-Mikke, was the former URP leader, however, he left the party without any formal split (Szczerbiak 2014). In the same year, Libertas Poland and Self-Defence (SRP) disappear (RegV). The coalition Europa Plus - Your Movement has been formed by Your Movement (a new political actor), Democratic Party (CL in 2009), Social Democracy of Poland (CL in 2009), Racja Polskiej Lewicy (CL in 2009), Left Union (PPP in 2009), and Polish Labor Party (PPP in 2009). The CL in 2009 included also The Greens (Z). Thus, in 2014, EuropePlus and Z are compared with CL and PPP (AltV). In 2019, the European coalition has been formed by Civic Platform (PO), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Modern (N), and the Greens (Z) (AltV). Moreover, the parties composing in 2014 the Europe+ (E+) coalition either dissolved or joined the European coalition in 2019 (AltV). Additionally, the party Labour Union (in 2014 in coalition with SLD) run within the list Left Together with the new party Together (Razem) (AltV). Thus, the lists PO, SLD, PSL, E+, Z, running in 2014, are compared with European Coalition and Left Together in 2019 (AltV). The list PiS included also Poland Togheter and United Poland (AltV).
The 2014 coalition Congress of the New Right (NP) is linked both with the alliance Confederation (K) and the list PolEXIT, additionally, K includes also the National Movement (RN) (AltV). Thus, NP and RN are compared with K and PolEXIT (AltV). Finally the Parties Spring and Kukiz’15 are considered new parties (RegV).

**Portugal**

In 1989, the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP) and the Popular Democratic Union (UDP) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 1989, the Socialist Party (PS) includes the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) (AltV). In 1994, UDP, Politics XXI (PXXI, considered in continuity with MDP), and the People’s Monarchist Party (PPM) disappear (RegV). Moreover, in 1994, the PRD splits from the PS (AltV). In 1999, the Left Bloc (BE, merge of the UDP, PXXI, and the Revolutionary Socialist Party [PSR]) emerges (RegV). In 2004, the Portuguese Workers’ Communist Party (PCTP) and the New Democracy Party (PND) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 2004, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the People’s Party (CDS-PP) form a joint list (AltV). In 2009, the Hope for Portugal Movement (MEP) emerges (RegV), while the PND disappears (RegV). In 2014, the Earth Party (MPT), Livre, and People-Animals-Nature (PAN) emerge (RegV), while the MEP disappears (RegV). In 2019, Alliance (A), We, The Citizens! (NC) and Basta! (B, including People's Monarchist Party [PPM] and Citizenship and Christian Democracy [PPV/CDC]) emerge (RegV); PCTP and MPT disappear (RegV); PSD and CDS-PP run separately (AltV).

**Romania**

In 2009, New Generation Party (PRM), National Initiative (PIN) and the Party of the Roma disappear (RegV). The Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) has been created in 2007 as a merger between the Democratic Party (PD) and Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) (AltV) (Stan and Zaharia, 2008). In 2014, the independent list of Mircea Diaconu, the People’s Party-Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD), the Romanian Ecologist Party (PER) and Civil Force (FC) emerge (RegV), while the Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party disappears (RegV). The former independent and European MP Elena Basescu, joined the PDL immediately after her election, while the Popular Movement Party (PMP) splits from PDL in 2013 (Stan and Zaharia 2010, Stan and Zaharia 2014). So, the PDL and BASESCU in 2009 are compared with PDL and PMP in 2014 (AltV). The 2019 EP election is marked by a wide number of splits and merges. The Social Democratic Union, running in 2014, was composed by Social Democratic Party, Conservative Party and National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR). The Social Democratic Party suffered a split in 2017 led by the former prime minister Victor Ponta, and generating the party PRO Romania (AltV). The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) was formed by the Conservative Party and the Liberal Reformist Party, which is a splinter party of PNL (the split occurred on 3 July 2014). In parallel,
the Democratic Liberal Party, running alone in 2014, firstly absorbed Civic Force in July 2014 and then merged on November 2014 with PNL. Moreover, in June 2015, the PP-DD merged with UNPR and the Ecologist Party officially declared its support to the Social Democratic Party. Considering all these process of splits and merges, the volatility is computed comparing Democratic Union, National Liberal Party, Democratic Liberal Party, People's Party Dan Diaconescu, Civic Force and Ecologist Party, running in 2014, with National Liberal Party, Social Democratic Party, Pro Romania, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, National Union for the progress of Romania in 2019 (AltV). The 2020 USR-PLUS alliance is considered a new party and the Greater Romania Party disappeared (RegV).

**Slovakia**
The Alliance of New Citizens (ANO) and the Movement for Democracy - People's Union (HZD/LU) disappear (RegV). Conversely, the new party Freedom and Solidarity and the Green Party emerge (RegV). The Conservative Democrats (KDS), running with the Civic Conservative Party (OKS), are a splinter party of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). Thus, the KDH and OKS in 2009 are compared with KDH and KDS-OKS in 2014 (Just 2015). In 2014, Free Forum (SF) and the Green Praty (SZ) disappear (RegV). Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OL'ANO), Most-Hid, Party TIP, and Law and Justice (PaS) emerge (RegV). New Majority (NOVA) is a new personal party, created in 2012 by Daniel Lipšic, a prominent representative of the KDH (RegV) (Rybar and Spac 2017). In 2014, NOVA forms a coalition with OKS-KDS, that is compared with the OKS-KDS' one running in 2009 (AltV). In 2019, the coalition between Progressive Slovakia and Together (PS/S) is considered a new party (RegV). The same occurs with Christian Union and We are Family (RegV). Numerous relevant parties disappear: TIP, PaS, Nation and Justice and Magnificat Slovakia (RegV). disappeared (RegV). Finally, The Slovak Democratic Christian Union (SDKU), the Party of Democratic Slovakia (changing its name in National Coalition), and the Coalition of the Communist Party of Slovakia fall below the 1% threshold (RegV).

**Slovenia**
In 2009, Slovenia is Ours (SJN) and the Voice of Slovenian Women (GSZ) disappear (RegV). New Politics (Zares) is a splinter party of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (AltV) (Rose and Munro 2009; Ersson 2012). In 2014, I Believe (Verjanem), United Left (ZL), List-Kacin-Concrete, Positive Slovenia (PS), Dream Job (SS), Pirate Party (PSS), Solidarity (S) and Civic List emerge (RegV). Moreover, LDS and Youth Party of Slovenia (SMS), and ZARES disappear (RegV) (Krašovec and Deželan 2014). In 2019, the parties I Believe, List Kacin, Dream Job and Solidarity disappeared (RegV). Contextually, List of Marjan Sarec, Patriotic League, Modern Centre Party, and Greens of Slovenia emerge (RegV). The list Alliance of Alenka Bratusek is considered a splinter of Positive Slovenia (AltV). In 2014, New Slovenia
and Slovenian People’s Party were running in coalition, while in 2019 the latter run with the Slovenian Democratic Party. Thus, the coalition New Slovenia-Slovenian People’s Party and the Slovenian Democratic Party (2014) are compared in 2019 with the coalition Slovenian Democratic Party-Slovenian People’s Party and New Slovenia (AltV).

Spain

In 1989, the Ruiz-Mateos Group (in continuity with Social Action [AS]), the Green List (LV, which includes the Greens [LV] and the Confederation of the Greens [CV]), the Ecologist Greens (LVE, a split from the Humanist Platform [PH–FV]) emerge (RegV). Moreover, the People’s Party (PP) includes the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Regionalist Aragonese Party (PAR) (AltV). Furthermore, in 1989, the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain–PCC (PCPE–PCC) splits from United Left (IU) (AltV). Finally, the National Coalition (CN) includes the Europeanist Union (PNV–PGN), the Canarian Independent Groups (AIC), and the Nationalist Party of Castile and León (PANCAL) (AltV). In 1994, LV, LVE, Forum–Democratic and Social Centre (Foro–CDS, considered in continuity with the Democratic and Social Centre [CDS]), Popular Unity (HB), the Andalusian Coalition–Andalusian Power (PA–PAP, considered in continuity with the Andalusian Party [PA]), the Ruiz-Mateos Group, and the Asturian Party (PAS, considered in continuity with Left of the Peoples [IP]) disappear (RegV). Furthermore, in 1994, United Extremadura (EU) and the Regionalist Party of the Leonese Country (PREPAL) split from CN (AltV), while the Federation of Regional Parties (FPR) joins the CN (AltV). In 1999, The Greens–Left of the Peoples (LV–IP) splits from United Left–United and Alternative Left (IU–EUIA) (AltV), while the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (POR) and the Group for Building a Revolutionary Workers’ Party – Workers’ Socialist Party (GPOR-PST) join IU–EUIA (AltV). Moreover, in 1999, the Party for Independence (PI), the Commoners' Land–Castilian Nationalist Party (TC–PNC), and European Coalition (CE) split from the Nationalist Coalition–Europe of the Peoples (CN–EP, considered as the successor of For the Europe of the Peoples [PEP], which included the PI and the TC–PNC, and of the Nationalist Coalition [CN]) (AltV). Furthermore, in 1999, the Andalusian Coalition–Andalusian Power (PA–PAP) and The Greens–Ecologist Confederation of Catalonia (EV–CEC) join CN–EP (AltV). In 2004, the New Green Left (NIV) is jointly considered with the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) (AltV). Moreover, in 2004, Galeusca–Peoples of Europe includes Convergence and Union (CIU), Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), and the Party for Independence (PI) (AltV). Furthermore, in 2004, the Socialist Action Party (PASOC) splits from United Left–Initiative for Catalonia Greens–EUIA (IU–ICV–EUIA) (AltV), while The Greens–Left of the Peoples (LV–IP) joins IU–ICV–EUIA (AltV). Moreover, in 2004, Europe of the Peoples (EDP) includes CN–EP and Andechas Astur (AA) (AltV). Furthermore, in 2004, United Extremadura (EU) and PAS join CE (AltV). In 2009, Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD) and Internationalist Initiative – Solidarity among Peoples (II–SP)
emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 2009, the Coalition for Europe (CEU) is considered in continuity with Galeusca–Peoples of Europe and CE (AltV), while the Valencian Union (UV) and United Extremadura (EU) split from CEU (AltV). Furthermore, the Anti-Capitalist Left – Global Revolt (IZAN–RG) splits from IU-ICV (AltV). Moreover, in 2009, Europe of the Peoples–Greens (EDP–V) is considered in continuity with EDP and Aralar (AltV), while the Socialist Party of Andalusia (PSA) and AA split from EDP–V (AltV). In 2014, Podemos (considered in continuity with IZAN-RG), Citizens (CS, considered in continuity with Liberal Democratic Centre [CDL]), European Spring (PE, considered in continuity with For a Fairer World [PUMJ]), the Animalist Party Against Mistreatment of Animals (PACMA) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 2014, Vox and Asturias Forum (FAC) split from the PP (AltV). Furthermore, PA (in continuity with PSA) splits from CEU (AltV). In 2019, UPyD merges into CS (AltV), while IU merges into Podemos (AltV). Moreover, in 2019, Free for Europe (JUNTS) and Coalition for a Solidarity Europe (CEUS) split from CEU; Commitment for Europe (CpE) and PUMJ are in continuity with PE.

Sweden

‘Others’ are always not disaggregated (0.4% in 1995, 0.1% in 1999, 1.0% in 2004, 0.2% in 2009, 0.7% in 2014, and 1.1% in 2019) (OthV). In 1999, the Sarajevo List (SL) disappears (RegV). In 2004, the June List (JL) and the Sweden Democrats (SD) emerge (RegV). In 2009, the Pirate Party (PP) and the Feminist Initiative (FI) emerge (RegV). In 2014, JL disappears (RegV). In 2019, PP and FI disappear (RegV).


United Kingdom

In 1999 and 2014, ‘Others’ are not disaggregated (0.8% and 0.3% respectively). Independents for which we do not have separate information have been treated as a unique ‘party’, but always included in OthV, so as to not inflate either RegV or AltV. In 1984, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) emerges (RegV). Moreover, in 1984, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) splits from the Labour party (LAB) and joins the SDP-Liberal alliance with the Liberal party (AltV). Moreover, in 1984, the International Marxist party joins the LAB (AltV). In 1989, the Green party emerges (RegV), while the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and UUP disappear (RegV). Moreover, in 1989, the SDP splits from the Social and Liberal Democrats (later, Liberal Democrats [LD]) (AltV). In 1994, the Plaid Cymru (PC) and SDLP emerge (RegV), while the Moderate Labour party splits from LAB (AltV). Moreover, in 1994, the Scottish Green party splits from the Green Party of England and Wales (GPEW) (AltV). In 1999, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the UUP and the Sinn Féin (SF) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 1999, the
Pro-Euro Conservative party splits from the Conservative party (CON) (AltV). In 2004, the Pro-Euro Conservative party, the PC, the SF, the UUP, and the SDLP disappear (RegV), while the British National Party (BNP) and Respect emerge (RegV). In 2009, Respect disappears (RegV), while the English Democrats party (ED), the Christian Party – Christian People’s Alliance (CP-CPA), and the Socialist Labour party (SC) emerge (RegV). Moreover, in 2009, the UUP joins the CON (AltV). In 2014, an Independence from Europe (IE) emerges (RegV). Moreover, in 2014, the UUP splits from the CON (AltV), while Britain First (BF) splits from the BNP (AltV). In 2019, Brexit Party emerges (RegV, as its leader Nigel Farage left UKIP in December 2018 sitting as an Independent MEP for a while before joining Brexit Party in April 2019). Moreover, in 2019, IE and BNP disappear (RegV), while Change UK split from LAB (AltV). The data source for 2019 is the BBC (https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/crjeqkdevwvt/the-uks-european-elections-2019).

How to cite this dataset?

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