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## Vote (de-)nationalisation and party system change in Italy (1948–2013)

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The nationalisation of politics is a major political phenomenon deriving from the historical trend towards the formation of national electorates and party systems brought about by the progressive reduction in the significance of territorial cleavages. During the last 50 years, though the issue of vote nationalisation has been addressed by a large volume of literature, serious analysis of the Italian case has never made much progress, having been limited to the reflections of a few isolated authors. Over the past 20 years, a period marking the passage from the long period of polarised pluralism to the so-called ‘Second Republic’, the Italian party system has undergone profound changes, with the continuing emergence and growth of new political parties and a sharp increase in the levels of party fragmentation and volatility. How has nationalisation of the vote evolved in this changing framework? This article analyses the process of (de-)nationalisation of the vote in Italy and explains its evolution between the first (1948–1992) and the second (1994–2013) phases of the republican era, assessing the impact of various possible determinants. The empirical analysis shows that vote nationalisation in Italy is strongly associated with competition factors and with the level of institutionalisation of the party system.

**Keywords:** vote nationalisation; party system change; Italian elections; institutionalisation; cleavages

### Introduction

This article analyses the evolution of vote nationalisation in Italy since the beginning of the republican era (1948), linking this phenomenon with the changing and unstable framework of the Italian party system.

The topic is relevant since vote nationalisation, conceived as the level of territorial homogeneity in party support, may have implications that go far beyond elections, affecting the whole democratic process. Indeed, the concept of vote nationalisation, as we will shortly demonstrate, is closely linked with macro-historical processes such as democratisation and nation-building; and, as emphasised by Rokkan (1970, 227), it is a central element of the formation of a political and democratic citizenship. Whether or not Italian parties are able to represent the nationwide interests and preferences of voters is a crucial question for the proper functioning of the representative process and may in the long run affect the stability of the democratic regime and the unity of a nation state, as the recent Belgian and Scottish cases show. Furthermore, despite the flourishing of studies dealing with the process of nationalisation both in America and in Europe, this topic has largely been neglected in Italy, where serious analysis has never been taken forward, aside

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from the reflections of a few isolated contributors (Bartolini 1976; Pavsic 1985; Agnew 1988).

The structure of the article is as follows: in the next section, I present a brief review of the literature on the topic and of the most relevant indicators provided for empirical measurement of the phenomenon; the section following shows the historical trend of vote nationalisation followed by the Italian party system during the republican era and also the values and the trends of nationalisation/de-nationalisation of the main parties; the three subsequent sections provide an explanation of the vote nationalisation trend in Italy by introducing three sets of potential explanatory factors; a concluding section follows.

### **Vote nationalisation: theory and measurement**

The theory of the nationalisation of politics was first developed in the American context and originates from Schattschneider's analysis of the genesis of the US party system (1960). According to Schattschneider, the nationalisation of politics consists in the shift from sectional to national politics, and it is meant as an increased competitiveness of elections, with the main national parties contesting seats in each state.

In the European context, the most systematic contribution on the vote nationalisation process, from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view, is provided by Caramani (2004). According to Caramani, the nationalisation of politics is a major political phenomenon reflecting the historical evolution from the highly localised and territorialised politics that characterised the early phases of electoral competition, to the formation of national electorates and party systems, brought about by a progressive reduction in the significance of territorial political cleavages. Caramani clearly establishes both the timing and the main determinants of the nationalisation process.

As far as the timing of the process is concerned, Caramani states that the formation of national electorates and party systems and the progressive homogenisation of party support in Europe took place in the early phases of development of electoral competition, between the end of the nineteenth century and World War I. By the 1920s, electoral competition was already nationalised, and the period after World War II gave rise to a long-standing pattern of fundamental stability in territorial configurations with only a slight tendency towards further nationalisation. Caramani cites much empirical evidence to support this finding, concluding that the timing of the process is directly related to the famous 'freezing hypothesis', formulated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 50), according to which, around the 1920s, cleavage structures and the related partisan alignments crystallised and remained stable in subsequent decades. This finding proves consistent with the previous research carried out by Rose and Urwin (1975, 45) who emphasised that the 'nationalization of party competition had already occurred by the start of the post-war era'.

Moving to the factors affecting the nationalisation process in Europe, Caramani's theoretical scheme is based on the three fundamental dimensions concerning the structuring of political space: state formation, democratisation and nation-building (2004, 195).

The process of state formation has historically concerned the definition of the external territorial boundaries of the state as well as of the functional and sociocultural boundaries regarding membership of the national community expressed in the concept of citizenship. This led to a process of power centralisation and, quoting Hirschman (1970), to a reduction in the availability of the 'exit options'. The process of democratisation is instead related to the development of mass politics and party competition through the spread of channels of institutional representation and the progressive extension of voting rights to

previously excluded citizens. Following Hirschman's terminology, democratisation has allowed for the development of 'voice' channels. Finally, the process of nation-building refers to the attempt at cultural penetration and standardisation of the peripheries carried out by the centre-builders; this attempt has resulted in the homogenisation of geographical areas, in the weakening of internal territorial boundaries and in the transformation of former territorial cleavages into functional ones (based on interests/ideologies), thus bringing a progressive reduction in the territoriality of the 'voice options'.

These three macro-processes (state formation, democratisation and nation-building) and their political consequences (reduction in the availability of exit options, the development of internal voice channels and a progressive reduction in the degree of their territoriality) have structured the European political space and have fostered the evolution of European countries towards nationalised patterns of electoral competition.

Nonetheless, these processes have not always been entirely successful: in some polities nationalisation has not been fully achieved, while in others it has completely failed, thus allowing the survival of a territorially based politics (as, for example, in Belgium or Switzerland).

As regards the empirical measurement of vote nationalisation, the literature has proposed a number of different indicators.<sup>1</sup> They range from the most elementary indicators of competitiveness such as the 'number of uncontested seats' (Rose and Urwin 1975, 19) or the 'territorial coverage' of the parties (Caramani 2004, 61), to measures that specifically focus on the nationalisation of the vote, such as the so-called 'inflation' measures (Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Moenius and Kasuya 2004), the indices of variance (Rose and Urwin 1975, 30; Ersson, Janda, and Lane 1985; Lee 1988) and the distribution coefficients. These latter are by far the most reliable ones and conceive the nationalisation of the vote as the level of evenness in the distribution of party support across the territorial units of a country. Jones and Mainwaring (2003, 142) created the party nationalisation score<sup>2</sup> (PNS), which is simply the inverted Gini coefficient, a widely used index of inequality across units. The PNS varies from 0 (the party receives 100% of its votes in one subnational unit and 0% in all the rest) to 1 (it receives the same share of votes in every subnational unit). In order to take into account the systemic level of nationalisation, Jones and Mainwaring (2003) developed the party system nationalisation score (PSNS), which consists of the sum of the PNSs for each party weighted by its share of the vote nationally. The contribution of every party to the PSNS is thus proportional to its electoral strength.

Although it is certainly superior to its existing alternatives (see Table 1 for a schematic comparison among indices) and allows for both cross-country and over-time comparability, PNS, as emphasised by Bochsler (2010, 157), has two main shortcomings: it does not take into account the size of territorial units (measured in terms of numbers of voters), nor the number of units (all else equal, if the number of units increases, the PNS score decreases). In order to correct for these two failings, Bochsler (164) develops the standardised PNS (sPNS). Its complex formula<sup>3</sup> is exponentiated to  $1/\log(E)$ , where  $\log$  stands for the logarithmic function and  $E$  represents the effective number of territorial units. This makes it possible to take account of the size and the number of the territorial units, thus solving both the failings of the simple PNS. The empirical analyses of Central and Eastern European countries carried out by Bochsler (164–165), and of the 1958 Greek election carried out by Andreadis (2011) show that the sPNS is the index with by far the lesser variance on scores calculated at different levels of data aggregation. Performing as the more reliable measure of vote nationalisation, the sPNS has been chosen as the reference index to operationalise the dependent variable in the current analysis.

Table 1. Indicators of party system nationalisation and their shortcomings.

Index	Reported problems (1–7)						
	1. No consideration of party support level	2. Lacking upper limit	3. Does not take different sizes of territorial units into account	4. Lacking scale invariance ('party size problem')	5. Insensitivity to transfers	6. Insensitivity to the number of territorial units	7. Large local party-system bias
a) Competition indices							
Number of uncontested seats	x		x		x	x	
Safe seats	x		x		x	x	
Territorial coverage index	x				x	x	
b) Inflation measures							
Deviation		x	x			x	x
Inflation index		x				x	
Weighted inflation index		x				x	
c) Indices of variance							
Index of variation		x	x	x	x	x	
Mean absolute deviation/Lee index		x	x	x	x	x	
Standard deviation		x	x	x		x	
SCV <sub>w</sub>			x			x	
IPR			x		x	x	
CRII					x	x	
d) Distribution coefficients							
PNS			x			x	

Source: Adapted from Bochster (2010, 157).

### The (de)-nationalisation of the Italian party system: a non-linear trend

After a long period of stability during the first phase of the republican era (from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s) – a phase characterised by the persistence of polarised pluralism (Sartori 1976) – the Italian party system started to crumble. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Italian politics has experienced significant changes, with the complete transformation of its relevant political actors (that is why the literature often refers to the last 20 years as the ‘Second Republic’). From 1994, the new party system was characterised by a pattern of bipolar competition based on the alternation in government of two opposing electoral coalitions, one of the centre-left, the other of the centre-right. Despite the re-establishment of stability, the new period of bipolar competition was marked by a congenital lack of structuring and, prior to the emergence of an almost two-party format after the 2008 general election, there was a continuing rise of new political parties and a sharp increase in the levels of party fragmentation and volatility (Chiaromonte 2010). Finally, the general election of 2013 brought about an unprecedented transformation in the structure of the party system. The former almost two-party format was replaced by an unstable system with three relevant poles, thus transforming the bipolar competition that had characterised the previous 20 years. The new ‘tri-polar’ system is, indeed, characterised by the presence of a new leading actor, the Five-star Movement (M5S), a populist, anti-system party. Led by the former comedian Beppe Grillo, it emerged from the election as the most voted list with 25.6% of the votes.<sup>4</sup> This major change was accompanied by a sudden shift of many of the party-system indicators, especially electoral volatility, which rocketed to almost unprecedented levels.

How is this historical evolution reflected in over-time changes in the extent of vote nationalisation? In order to calculate sPSNS, the national-level election results of Italian parties for the Chamber of Deputies during the 17 elections of the period from 1948 to 2013 have been disaggregated into the 20 territorial units corresponding to the Italian regions. Political parties have been selected when they have polled at least 3% of the votes nationwide or 4% in at least one territorial unit. Parties fulfilling neither of these criteria have been excluded from the analysis.<sup>5</sup>

Figure 1 plots the values for vote nationalisation in Italy through time. The trend of Bochslers’s index scores follows a non-linear path across the 17 elections of the republican era. The values of the sPSNS tend to grow slightly during the first 30 years after World




Figure 1. Trend of vote nationalisation in Italy, 1948–2013.

War II, reaching their highest peak in the 1976 election (.893). After this, they start to decline, with a sharp decrease at the end of the First Republic, reaching their lowest point in 1994 (.758<sup>6</sup>), the election marking the start of the transition towards the Second Republic. Since 1994, vote nationalisation has risen again, reaching a new peak in 2006 (.873), although remaining, on average, at lower levels than before. Despite being an earthquake election as pointed out earlier, in 2013 the level of nationalisation did not undergo a major shift, but only a small increase (.862). In general, during the whole time span, there was a quite constant level of vote nationalisation, with the exception of the de-structuration<sup>7</sup> and re-structuration years, 1992–1996.

From this evidence, Caramani's hypothesis of long-term stability 'with a slight tendency toward nationalization' (2004, 90) after 1945 in Europe is called into question with regard to the Italian case, at least for the period from 1976 to the present.

As far as individual parties are concerned, it is important to consider not only their mean level of territorial homogeneity but also the trends followed by each of them over time. As Table 2 shows, four main electoral phases of about 15 years each can be identified: the first concerns the structuring of the post-war party system (1948–1963); the second (1964–1979) the 'golden age' of the First Republic; the third (1980–1993) in which the consolidated system starts to collapse, and finally the most recent phase, which coincides with the Second Republic.

The literature on Italian electoral geography (Galli et al. 1968; Corbetta, Parisi, and Schadee 1988; Diamanti 2009) emphasises the existence of large electoral differences between the so-called 'white zone' in the north-east, characterised by the dominance of the Christian Democrats (DC), and the Apennine 'red' regions, with a high Communist prevalence. Despite this, both major parties of the First Republic have high sPNS coefficients.

Christian Democracy records a mean sPNS of .912, which is the highest among the whole sample, and the Communist Party (PCI) scores .860, a coefficient that reflects greater heterogeneity as compared to the DC, but is still lower than expected. Support for the third largest party of the First Republic, the Socialist Party (PSI), also appears evenly distributed (.894), while all the other, smaller, parties contesting the elections in the period 1948–1992 have lower scores. With the exception of the Social-Democrats (PSDI), all the other national parties of the period have a Bochsler's index smaller than .800, a level that could be considered as the point of transition between a homogeneous and a heterogeneous territorial distribution. The Liberal Party (PLI) gathers most of its votes in north-western Italy (Piedmont, Liguria and the city of Milan); the Republican Party (PRI) receives support that is territorially concentrated in certain areas of Romagna and Tuscany, while support for the extreme-right parties (the Italian Social Movement (MSI) and the Monarchists) is concentrated mainly in the South.

During the last phase of the First Republic (1980–1993), the mean level of vote nationalisation for Italian parties decreases, and this is partly due to the emergence of new political forces whose support is very unevenly distributed. They include not only regionalist parties – such as the Liga Veneta (.100), Associazione per Trieste (.207), the Partito Sardo d'Azione (.094) and the party most responsible for the country's vote de-nationalisation, the Northern League (LN) (.432) – but also formally 'national' parties having distinct regional support bases, like La Rete (.516), whose votes come especially from Sicily. As these new parties enter the electoral arena, the main established political forces of the system undergo a process of de-nationalisation of their vote: all except one (the MSI) of the five largest parties show a decrease in the mean level of sPNS between the second and the third electoral phases (and this decline is even more pronounced during



Table 2. Italian parties: mean share of votes and mean sPNS by electoral phase, 1948–2013.

Party	First Republic						Second Republic		1948–2013		N
	1948–1963		1964–1979		1980–1993		1994–2013				
	% Votes	sPNS	% Votes	sPNS	% Votes	sPNS	% Votes	sPNS	% Votes	sPNS	
Democrazia Cristiana	42.3	0.924	38.7	0.916	32.1	0.89			<b>38.2</b>	<b>0.912</b>	<b>11</b>
Partito Comunista Italiano	23.5	0.854	29.7	0.867	28.2	0.854			<b>27.3</b>	<b>0.860</b>	<b>9</b>
Partito Socialista Italiano	13.6	0.871	9.7	0.920	13.1	0.918	2.2	0.812	<b>11.1</b>	<b>0.894</b>	<b>10</b>
Movimento Sociale Italiano	4.4	0.738	6.7	0.758	6	0.822			<b>5.5</b>	<b>0.768</b>	<b>11</b>
Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano	5.6	0.797	4.1	0.889	3.2	0.800			<b>4.4</b>	<b>0.826</b>	<b>10</b>
Partito Repubblicano Italiano	1.7	0.649	2.7	0.845	4.4	0.872			<b>2.8</b>	<b>0.781</b>	<b>11</b>
Partito Liberale Italiano	4.5	0.806	3.9	0.780	2.6	0.802			<b>3.7</b>	<b>0.796</b>	<b>9</b>
Partito Naz. Monarchico/PDIUM	3.4	0.568	1.3	0.571					<b>3</b>	<b>0.568</b>	<b>5</b>
Südtiroler Volkspartei	0.5	0.024	0.5	0.023	0.5	0.022	0.5	0.023	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.023</b>	<b>16</b>
Union Valdôtaine	0.1	0.004	0.01	0.003	0.01	0.003	0.01	0.003	<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>15</b>
Partito Sardo d'Azione	0.2	0.033			0.2	0.124			<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.094</b>	<b>3</b>
Associazione per Trieste			0.2	0.033	0.2	0.381			<b>0.2</b>	<b>0.207</b>	<b>2</b>
Liga Veneta					0.4	0.100			<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.100</b>	<b>2</b>
Lega Nord					8.7	0.466	6.6	0.426	<b>6.9</b>	<b>0.432</b>	<b>7</b>
La Rete-Movimento Democratico					1.9	0.548	1.9	0.484	<b>1.9</b>	<b>0.516</b>	<b>2</b>
PDS-DS					16.1	0.790	19.3	0.809	<b>18.5</b>	<b>0.804</b>	<b>4</b>
Rifondazione Comunista					5.6	0.833	6.4	0.870	<b>6.2</b>	<b>0.862</b>	<b>5</b>
Verdi					2.7	0.826	2.6	0.872	<b>2.6</b>	<b>0.849</b>	<b>4</b>
Forza Italia							23.7	0.888	<b>23.7</b>	<b>0.888</b>	<b>4</b>
Alleanza Nazionale							13.4	0.824	<b>13.4</b>	<b>0.824</b>	<b>4</b>
Popolo della Libertà							29.4	0.897	<b>29.4</b>	<b>0.897</b>	<b>2</b>
Ccd-Cdu/UDC							4.6	0.836	<b>4.6</b>	<b>0.836</b>	<b>5</b>
Italia dei Valori							3.5	0.884	<b>3.5</b>	<b>0.884</b>	<b>3</b>
Ppi/La Margherita							10.8	0.898	<b>10.8</b>	<b>0.898</b>	<b>3</b>
Ulivo/PD							29.9	0.895	<b>29.9</b>	<b>0.895</b>	<b>3</b>
Movimento 5 Stelle							25.5	0.912	<b>25.5</b>	<b>0.912</b>	<b>1</b>
Scelta Civica							8.3	0.874	<b>8.3</b>	<b>0.874</b>	<b>1</b>
Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà							3.2	0.825	<b>3.2</b>	<b>0.825</b>	<b>1</b>
Fratelli d'Italia							2	0.825	<b>2</b>	<b>0.825</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0.851</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0.878</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0.843</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0.831</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>0.849</b>	<b>17</b>

Note: The values in bold are those which refer to the whole period under study (1948–2013) or those referring to the country average.

the course of the third phase, between the 1983 and the 1992 elections). The DC in particular, threatened by the LN's expansion in its former stronghold of the north-east, experiences a process of 'southernisation', shifting towards Southern Italy its centre of gravity; while the PCI sees an increase in the extent to which its support is concentrated in the so-called 'Red Belt' (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche). This process of geographical concentration – due to the appearance of new rivals on the electoral scene – is of great importance for understanding what have been the main determinants of nationalisation in Italy, and it will be considered again in the penultimate section.

As far as the parties of the Second Republic are concerned, support for the heirs of the First Republic's parties appears less evenly distributed than support for their predecessors: both the Partito Popolare (PPI) and the United Christian Democrats (CCD-CDU) have sPNS values quite far removed from those of the DC, while support for the PDS-DS is less evenly distributed than was support for the old PCI.<sup>8</sup> The parties with the highest vote nationalisation scores in the most recent phase are the two new large parties created shortly before the 2008 election, the Democratic Party (PD) and the People of Freedom (PdL), with scores of .895 and .897, respectively. Immediately below them is Berlusconi's party, Forza Italia (.888) – a media-oriented political force which was so unrelated to a specific territory that Diamanti called it a 'party without territory' (2009, 91) – as well as another personal party with a populist appeal – Italia dei Valori, led by the former public prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro (.884) – and the electoral cartel constructed by former Prime Minister Mario Monti (Scelta Civica), which has so far only contested the 2013 election (.874).

However, none of the parties that have contested elections since the early 1990s have mean vote nationalisation scores that match the score (.912) achieved by the main novelty of the 2013 election, the M5S. The party led by Beppe Grillo emerges as the political force with the most evenly distributed support in the whole of the republican era, at least equalling the mean score for the DC. Just like Forza Italia, the M5S is based on the populist appeal of its charismatic leader and seems to be unanchored to specific parts of the Italian territory. Evidence of this can be drawn from the absolutely unprecedented electoral geography of the party that has fundamentally undermined the historical stability reflected in the electoral map of Italy: the M5S is the strongest party in regions with very different electoral traditions, like the conservative Sicily, the 'red' Marche and even Veneto, which was the core of the former 'white zone' and later a Northern League stronghold.

Finally, as one might expect, the small ethno-regionalist parties like the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) in Trentino-Alto Adige and the Union Valdôtaine (UV) in Valle d'Aosta, given their minimal territorial coverage, have mean sPNS values that approach 0 (with .023 and .003, respectively).

### **Towards an explanation: the macro-sociological determinants**

Since the historical trend of nationalisation in Italy does not follow a linear path, it is interesting to understand what factors have influenced it. In other words, what variables explain the evolution of vote nationalisation in Italy over time?

This section and the following two assess the impact of various possible determinants, ranging from macro-sociological factors to institutional ones, to others linked to the structure of competition. The macro-sociological literature (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini 2000) has emphasised the role of social cleavages in shaping the European party systems, and in particular the impact of the class cleavage in structuring the European political space in functional terms, with opposing left–right alignments. As regards the process of nationalisation, the class cleavage, based on a functional division

between the interests of the working class and those of employers, has been a strong homogenising factor (Caramani 2004, 196), because it has created non-territorial nationwide alignments that have been expressed in nationalised party families: the Social-Democratic and, on the opposite side, the Conservative and the Liberal families. These have expanded their support, throughout national territories, at the expense of territorially concentrated party families, the expression of old ethno-linguistic and religious cleavages. In this context, it becomes important to find a way empirically to assess the strength of the class cleavage in Italy, in order to establish whether it is related to the process of nationalisation, the expectation being of a trend towards de-nationalisation as the class cleavage loses its salience. Measuring the strength of the class cleavage in a country from a non-electoral point of view (to avoid problems of endogeneity with the dependent variable) is quite complex. A good proxy is to measure organisational density, which is one of the three dimensions of a cleavage<sup>9</sup> (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 208), through the use of two indicators: the ratio of the left parties' membership to the total electorate<sup>10</sup> (the 'left party membership density') and trade-union density,<sup>11</sup> which is the ratio of union membership to the size of the employed labour force in the country.

Left party membership density and trade-union density are not considered as independent determinants of party-system (in)stability but as different components of a single determinant, that is, organisational density as one aspect of the strength of the class cleavage. For this reason, again adopting Bartolini and Mair's strategy, we have combined the two indices into a single inclusive index of class-cleavage strength. Deriving a composite index from two independent ones is quite an easy operation: the new index is simply the half-sum of the two previous indices expressed in standardised form (in other words, its observations are the half-sum of the Z-scores of the other two indices). In this way, a new composite and standardised index is created. It can be conceived as a quite reliable proxy of the strength of the class cleavage.

While the class cleavage has, historically, played a fundamental role in the structuring of nationwide electoral competition based on the functional left–right dimension, culture-related cleavages have produced the opposite result. Scholars have highlighted the role of culture-related cleavages as the main source of 'deviation' (Rokkan 1970, 120) of European nation states from the main path towards centralisation and homogenisation brought about by the activities of the nation-building elites. Therefore, the presence of an ethnic, linguistic or religious minority in a given country has usually led to the formation of 'parties of territorial defence', since this kind of conflict is of a predominantly territorial nature<sup>12</sup> (the struggle of the culturally distinct periphery against the efforts of standardisation led by the ruling elite) and has translated into parties with a remarkably uneven distribution of support.

Cultural diversity is considered an important factor in the territorial differentiation of party support within countries even today. As posited by Caramani, 'the survival of territoriality in politics today can be principally explained through cultural cleavages that resisted the homogenising impact of class politics' (2005, 318). Most of the recently published articles on vote nationalisation emphasise the role of 'pre-industrial cleavages' in shaping territorially based electoral competition (Caramani 2004, 7) and show that the level of cultural (namely ethnic, linguistic or religious) diversity is positively and significantly associated with a de-nationalised outcome (Lago and Lago 2010, 6–7; Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola 2009, 1331; Harbers 2010, 615; Lago 2011, 11; Schakel 2012, 22–24; Simón 2013, 32).

The most commonly used measure of aggregate cultural diversity is the fractionalisation index devised by Alesina et al. (2003). It is defined as the probability that two

randomly selected individuals in a country belong to a different group and it ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 implies a perfectly homogeneous country, while 1 indicates a country where each individual belongs to a different group. For example, an ethnic fractionalisation score of .25 refers to a country where the probability that two randomly selected people belong to two different ethnic groups is 25%. The same logic applies to the linguistic and the religious index. The aggregate index of cultural fractionalisation is therefore simply the mean of the three indices described above. The most important shortcoming of Alesina et al.'s data archive is that it only provides one score for each country: in other words, it cannot be used to assess the temporal variance of such indices, thus not allowing for cross-time comparisons, which are crucial for the purposes of the current research. That is why, to obtain temporal variability, I have preferred to rely on other studies, specifically, the one by Bartolini (2000, 186) and the one by Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall (2012, 202–203). Furthermore, as far as religious affiliation is concerned, Patsiurko et al. treat the category of 'non-religious' people as a separate religious group. Of course, this treatment slightly inflates the level of religious fractionalisation but it better reflects the religious diversity of the Italian society, especially in the wake of the growing secularisation trend experienced in recent decades.

Figure 2 plots the evolution in the strength of the class and cultural cleavages in post-war Italy. For the sake of comparison, the index of cultural fractionalisation has been standardised, as has the index for the strength of the class cleavage. The chart lines of both indices reveal the presence of two clear patterns. Until the end of the 1970s, Italy was a culturally homogeneous country, without any distinctive ethno-linguistic or religious divide, while the organisational density of the class cleavage appears to have become increasingly salient in the Italian society, reaching its peak with the 1976 elections. From then on, it experienced a sharp decline during the 1980s and, finally, a period of stability at quite low levels during the Second Republic. Meanwhile, cultural diversity has started to grow exponentially, given increasing ethno-linguistic differentiation (due to the growth in immigration) and the process of secularisation (with the growing proportions of non-religious people). To summarise, if during the First Republic, Italian politics is divided along class lines, the Second Republic sees the growing importance of cultural cleavages, with the class cleavages dropping into the background. In order to understand how this changing pattern concerning the cleavage structure of Italian society has affected the




Figure 2. Evolution of social cleavages in Italy, 1948–2013.




Figure 3. Typology of cleavage structures and levels of nationalisation in Italy.

process of vote nationalisation, I have combined the two indices in the scatter plot in Figure 3, dividing the chart into four quadrants according to the mean values of both indices, so as to create a four-fold typology of the cleavage structure across the 17 post-war Italian elections and the related level of nationalisation associated with each 'type'.

Looking at the mean level of the sPSNS reported in each quadrant, the highest level of vote nationalisation can be found in the lower-right quadrant (.870), which includes the 1953 election and the three elections of the 1970s, all of them characterised by the highest levels of strength of the class cleavage and by a low level of cultural fractionalisation. Conversely, in the upper-left quadrant, grouping all the elections since 1992, which occurred in the context of a weak class cleavage and increasing cultural heterogeneity, the outcome is a quite regionalised political setting (mean sPSNS = .826). This means that, to the extent that the functional class cleavage has a strong hold upon society, voters tend to be homogeneously mobilised and tend to support the same national parties, thus creating a nationalised and non-territorial electoral competition based on the left-right dimension. This occurs especially when no relevant culture-related cleavages are present in the society (as in the lower-left and lower-right quadrants of Figure 3). When cultural cleavages emerge and the class cleavage starts to lose its salience, territorial claims and regional differences re-emerge, producing a de-nationalised electoral outcome (as in the upper-left quadrant). This typology provides much evidence supporting expectations related to the way social cleavages affect the level of nationalisation, but it is not able to distinguish – within the upper-left quadrant – between those elections with a markedly regionalised territorial configuration (1992, 1994 and 1996) and those with a fairly nationalised result (especially 2006 and, to a lesser extent, 2013). That is why we need to look at other factors potentially affecting the territorial configuration of party support, namely institutional constraints and factors linked to the structure of competition.

### The institutional constraints

Among the institutional factors, the effects of decentralisation, European integration and the electoral system will be taken into account.

To begin with, in recent years, many scholars have emphasised that economic and political decentralisation affects the level of nationalisation of the party system (Harbers 2010). In fact, while ‘voters are more likely to support national political parties, as the national government becomes more important for their lives’ (Lago and Lago 2010, 5), the growth of powers held by local authorities encourages the rise of regional parties (Chhibber and Kollman 1998) and also their electoral success (Brancati 2006, 656–657). This is because, with fiscal and political decentralisation, local parties have fewer incentives to merge with each other in order to be competitive at the national level, since the ‘prize’ of the national government becomes less attractive. Moreover, the lesser the power of central government, the larger the incentives for voters to vote for local parties and, thus, the lower the level of territorial homogeneity of the party system. In the literature, various indices<sup>13</sup> of decentralisation have been proposed. The most rigorous and reliable one is certainly the regional authority index (RAI) devised by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2010). It consists of two macro-dimensions (self-rule and shared rule) – which in turn are constructed from a number of indicators – and it assigns to each country a score ranging from 0 to 24 which is variable over time, according to the measures of decentralisation or centralisation implemented by each country.

Second, and on the other side of multi-level governance, the process of European integration might also have affected the nationalisation of the vote in Italy. According to some scholars (Keating 1998; Bartolini 2005), the transfer of powers from the nation states to the supranational European institutions has had a direct impact on the structuring of the political space of the old nation states. European integration has weakened the external territorial boundaries of the nation states and, in turn, it has built new external boundaries and new internal functional areas, thus structuring a new European political space that has challenged the national political structures. This process seems to foster the resurgence of territorial politics (Bartolini 2005, 251) as well as the strengthening of the historical centre–periphery cleavage – which translates into the increasing remobilisation of local actors demanding a redefinition of the relationship between the old national centres, and the peripheries (256–257). In order to measure the level of European integration, the institutional index of regional integration for the EU (IIRE) (Dorrucchi et al. 2002, 7–8) proves useful. It ranges from 0 to 100 according to four successive stages of integration (a free-trade area and customs union; a common market; economic union; complete economic integration), each of which assigns 25 points.

A third possible institutional determinant is the electoral system, even if its effect on nationalisation is not entirely clear. The literature has focused on the role of district magnitude: according to Cox and Knoll (2003, 6), ‘the larger the district magnitudes in the system, the fewer wasted votes there will be in each district’. This means that in single-member plurality (SMD) systems there will be more wasted votes and, consequently, a much greater incentive for politicians representing minorities to link with others and combine votes across districts. Therefore, nationalisation should decrease as district magnitude increases. Morgenstern, Swindle and Castagnola (2009, 1327–1328) have exactly the opposite expectation. They argue that SMD systems should decrease nationalisation relative to proportional (PR) systems. According to the authors,

since a plurality is required to win the seat in SMD systems, parties may avoid spending the resources to compete where they have little chance of winning. In a PR system, by contrast, wasted vote winning opportunities are costly, because it takes far fewer votes to win a legislative seat.<sup>14</sup>

These contrasting opinions lead Lago (2011) to hypothesise that the district magnitude is not related to nationalisation. However, it can be argued that some other features, such

as the existence of a direct linkage between the election of the legislature, and government formation, the presence of high national thresholds and of a large portion of upper-tier seats, encourage the formation of a nationalised party system, since they provide an obvious incentive to politicians to ally across district boundaries (Cox 1999). The impact of the electoral system on vote nationalisation in Italy will be tested through the average district magnitude and Gallagher's index of disproportionality<sup>15</sup> (1991). The former is the ratio of the total number of seats allocated in an electoral tier to the total number of districts in that tier. The latter measures the deviations from perfect proportionality when votes are translated into seats, and thus it provides a synthetic measure of the electoral system's strength.

In Table 3, we try to disentangle the relationship between the above-mentioned institutional constraints and the nationalisation of party support in post-war Italy. As far as the first two variables are concerned, there is no clear association with the level of territorial homogeneity. Both regional authority and European integration have gone up more or less constantly over time. Italy has moved from being a very centralised nation state to being a markedly regionalised polity, especially since the reform of Title V of the Constitution in 2001. At the same time, the process of European integration has seen huge advances, approaching – with the adoption of the single currency in 1999 – the level of total economic integration, that is, the last step identified by the Dorrucchi index. The expectation of increasing de-nationalisation produced by these two processes does not find empirical support. The emergence of regional authorities and the structuring of a European political space have taken place somewhat independently of the trend in vote nationalisation, given that sPSNS shows virtually the same mean level both at the top and at the bottom of the two indices. On the other hand, the two indices concerning the electoral system show a consistent relation with sPSNS: in Italy nationalisation increases as the electoral system becomes more proportional, and vice versa. The lower the barriers for representation, the more territorially homogeneous the electoral outcome. The highest level of disproportionality and the lowest district magnitude occur during the three elections held in accordance with the Mattarella law (which assigned 75% of the seats

Table 3. Institutional constraints and levels of nationalisation in Italy.

Institutional constraints		Period	Mean sPSNS
Regional authority index	Low (<10)	1948–1968	0.856
	Medium (10–20)	1972–1996	0.842
	High (>20)	2001–2013	0.857
Institutional index of regional integration for the EU	Free trade area and custom union (0–25)	1948–1963	0.851
	Common market (26–50)	1968–1976	0.879
	Economic union (52–75)	1979–1996	0.829
	Total economic integration (76–100)	2001–2013	0.856
Average district magnitude	Proportional system (19.43)	1948–1992	0.859
	Mattarella system (1.26)	1994–2001	0.805
	Calderoli system (23.73)	2006–2013	0.857
Disproportionality	Proportional system (2.87)	1948–1992	0.859
	Mattarella system (10.18)	1994–2001	0.805
	Calderoli system (8.89)	2006–2013	0.857



via a plurality system in single-member districts and 25% via PR), when sPSNS displays the highest level of territorial heterogeneity in Italian history. This finding is consistent with Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola (2009) and with Harbers (2010), while Cox and Knoll's argument fails. The presence of SMD has favoured parties whose support has been concentrated rather than evenly distributed (typically small- or medium-sized regional parties like the LN or SVP rather than small or medium-sized national parties like the Greens or the PPI). At the same time, however, Cox's claims about the incentives provided by the existence of a direct linkage between elections and government formation, high national thresholds and a large portion of upper-tier seats for a nationalised outcome prove rather correct. All these incentives have been provided by the Calderoli law, introduced in 2005, which established a formally proportional system with high national thresholds and a majority bonus for the winning coalition. Hence, it is a system with a large district magnitude but with strong majoritarian constraints, offering incentives to voters to express a national choice for a nationally competitive party/coalition (as occurred especially in the 2006 and the 2013 elections).

### The competition factors

Regarding the factors linked to the structure of the competition, the bulk of the literature on the Western European party systems has emphasised that the main changes since the 1970s have been increases in the levels of electoral volatility (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002), and the emergence of new parties with a subsequent increase in party-system fragmentation (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984). The decline of party identification and of the mass party has weakened the relationship between parties and voters, which is now less stable and more unpredictable than in the past. Parties have become exposed to the risks of the electoral market, which in turn has become more competitive due to the entrance of new political forces. These processes have been so striking in Italy, especially since the beginning of the 1990s, that scholars have recently referred to an ongoing process of party-system de-institutionalisation (Chiaromonte and Emanuele 2014). With respect to party systems, institutionalisation is 'the process by which the patterns of interactions between political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time' (Casal Bértoa 2014, 17). An ongoing process of party system de-institutionalisation is an empirical outcome that can result from an unstable electoral environment (repeated cases of highly volatile elections over a given period of time), where a significant part of the electoral instability is triggered by party-system regeneration (old parties disappear and new parties successfully emerge). The presence of these conditions – which in turn prevent stable and predictable interactions between parties, thus leading to serious democratic problems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) – can be assessed through very commonly used indicators, such as the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP<sup>16</sup>) by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), the vote share received by genuinely new parties<sup>17</sup> (Sikk 2005) and Pedersen's index of total volatility (TV)<sup>18</sup> (1979).

Figures 4 and 5 plot the evolution over time of party-system fragmentation (ENEP) and of volatility and party innovation (as the vote shares of genuinely new parties) in Italy. The three lines, representing the trend for each variable respectively, are very similar and – as expected – they all depict the period of the successive elections of 1992, 1994 and 1996 as one of unusual fragmentation, innovation and electoral instability. The same features re-emerged at the general election of 2013, when total volatility approached the unprecedented value of 1994 and the vote share of genuinely new parties rocketed to 35%, thanks to the success of the M5S and Scelta Civica.






Figure 4. Evolution of party system fragmentation in Italy, 1948–2013.




Figure 5. Total volatility and vote share of genuinely new parties in Italy, 1948–2013.

What is important here is to assess how the level of institutionalisation of the party system has affected the level of nationalisation. The core feature of a de-institutionalised party system is the unpredictability of interactions between parties. This context of uncertainty may have implications for the competitive approaches of parties, inducing them to develop strategies of territorial concentration<sup>19</sup> of their electoral support. This point is better understood if the Downsian spatial model (1957) is taken into consideration. According to Downs, in a two-party system, the parties tend to converge towards the centre of the ideological space in order to win the support of the median voter. An increase in the number of parties and the transition to a multi-party system causes a reduction in the size of the political space available to each party, so they lose the

incentive to move closer to each other. If, for example, a centre-left party moves towards the centre to gain moderate voters, it immediately loses a portion of its leftist voters to the extreme-left party (Downs 1957). In multi-party systems, therefore, no party has an incentive to enlarge its ideological space, but it will try to anchor itself to a specific ideological position.

Translating this logic from the language of ideology to the language of territory, which in turn represents the starting point of Downs's theory, it could be hypothesised that, as the number of parties increases and the political space available to each party diminishes, the old parties, threatened by the new challengers, are encouraged to develop strategies of territorial concentration of their support, aiming at reinforcing their electoral strongholds, instead of seeking to expand across the country with the risk of losing votes in their traditional heartlands. At the same time, new parties – especially if small – might be strongly incentivised to pursue territorial concentration, in order to build areas of electoral strength: this might be advantageous, at least in the initial phases of their growth, when they are seeking to surmount electoral thresholds and need to find areas that can ensure some safe seats. Moreover, increases in volatility in a context like the Italian one – dominated for a long time by the prevalence of the homogenising class cleavage, as seen in Section 3 – are likely to indicate an unfreezing of the old territorial configuration of party support, characterised by a high level of homogeneity (especially until the end of the 1970s).

Empirical evidence is thought likely to provide support for these expectations. Figure 6 plots the Italian elections according to their levels of total volatility and ENEP, so as to create a synthetic map of the characteristics of the Italian party system. For each of the four types, the mean level of vote nationalisation is reported. The absolute majority of elections (9 out of 17) fall into the lower-left quadrant, characterised by a limited party-system format and a low level of total volatility. It involves the whole of the period from 1958 to 1987 (as well as the 2008 elections), which can be conceived as the golden age of the First Republic, a period of pervasive stability and a high level of party-system




Figure 6. Party system institutionalisation and nationalisation in Italy, 1948–2013.

institutionalisation. The early post-war period (1948–1953), instead, shows a higher level of electoral instability, a typical property in a phase of party-system structuring. The right-hand part of *Figure 6* concerns the elections that have occurred since 1992. This group of elections fell into the upper-left quadrant of *Figure 3*, concerning the cleavage structure (weak class cleavage and strong cultural heterogeneity). One of the shortcomings of the macro-sociological explanation was the inability of that typology to explain why, among that group of elections, some are characterised by high territorial homogeneity, others the opposite. The institutional explanation offered some clarification, distinguishing the elections that occurred under the Mattarella law from the ones where the subsequent Calderoli law was in place, the latter placing more constraints on territorially concentrated parties. *Figure 6* provides a further explanation of this point. Hence, the process of party-system de-institutionalisation has not affected the whole of the period since 1992 equally: the 1994 elections, with their unprecedented level of party system fragmentation (7.58) and volatility (39.3) clearly distinguish themselves from the rest, followed by the 2013 elections. In contrast, the 2006 and the 1996 elections fall into the lower-right quadrant, given that they occur in the context of a fragmented but electorally stable party system. As expected, party support reaches its highest level of territorial heterogeneity in the quadrant of de-institutionalisation (sPSNS = .817), while the highest level of territorial homogeneity occurs in the quadrant of party-system institutionalisation (.868). The other two quadrants display intermediate scores of the index (.839 and .840).

The level of vote nationalisation of the Italian party system is therefore associated not only with the cleavage structure and the features of the electoral system, but also with the degree of institutionalisation of the party system. A highly nationalised electoral competition is likely to stem from a context dominated by the functional class cleavage, with high electoral stability and continuity over time of the same political forces (Italy from the 1950s to the 1980s), and with the proportional electoral system helping to preserve the status quo. With the progressive weakening of the homogenising class conflict, the increase in religious and ethnic heterogeneity and the start of a de-institutionalisation process, the Italian parties began, during the first half of the 1990s, to develop strategies of territorial concentration of party support and, consequently, the level of vote nationalisation went down sharply. This process was also encouraged by the adoption of a new electoral system based on SMD that favoured territorially concentrated parties. Finally, after a re-stabilisation of the party system during the Second Republic – even though on more fragile bases than in the past – the 2013 elections seemed to display all the features of a new, sudden, party-system de-institutionalisation process. Unlike what happened at the beginning of the 1990s, in 2013 this process did not result in a de-nationalised outcome, probably for two reasons: the incentives, created by the electoral law, for the parties to compete nationally and the fact that the new challengers (especially the M5S) have shown an absolutely unprecedented level of territorial homogeneity, especially if compared with the new political forces that emerged at the beginning of the 1990s (such as the LN or La Rete), the distribution of whose support showed marked territorial concentrations.

### Concluding remarks

The purpose of the present article has been to assess the degree of vote nationalisation in Italy during the republican era (1948–2013) and to identify its main determinants. Following a brief review of the main literature about vote nationalisation, the article has traced its evolution in Italy, both at the systemic and at the party levels, calculated through the use of Bochsler's standardised PNS (2010). The search for an explanation of the non-

linear trend followed by vote nationalisation in Italy during the post-war era has led to the introduction of three sets of possible determinants, following the assumptions of previous empirical research as well as my own expectations.

Empirical evidence has shown that the factors linked to the structure of the competition – although being widely neglected by the literature on the topic – have the most significant impact on vote nationalisation. At the same time, the cleavage structure and the features of the electoral system also offer important insights, while the other institutional constraints have proved not to be relevant, although they have received great emphasis by scholars studying nationalisation.

Therefore, the non-linear trend of nationalisation in Italy is closely linked to factors related to the ‘political’ context: party system fragmentation and volatility. The territorial homogeneity of electoral behaviour decreases as party fragmentation and electoral volatility increase. When more parties contest elections and more voters are available to change their former voting choices, the geographical distribution of parties’ support is less even. In other words, vote de-nationalisation seems to be associated with party-system de-institutionalisation.

The linkage between party system institutionalisation and vote nationalisation helps to explain the trend towards growing heterogeneity in the levels of nationalisation in Italy after the 1976 general elections – which represent the culmination of the post-war party system’s structuring (with near two-party competition between the DC and the PCI); furthermore, this connection clarifies why, as shown in the second section, the main parties of the First Republic (the DC and the PCI in particular) experienced a process of territorial concentration from the end of the 1970s, thus increasingly relying on the support of their strongholds (the regions of the South for the DC and the ‘Red belt’ regions for the PCI) in order to fend off the challenge of new parties (like the LN) that entered the electoral arena at a time when voters’ loyalties had become less stable and the electoral market had been more fluid than in the past.

Furthermore, the linkage between vote nationalisation and party system institutionalisation is also able to explain the evolution of the sPSNS trend during the Second Republic: the parties that emerged during the early 1990s (Forza Italia, the PDS, AN, the PRC, the CCD-CDU and so on) increased their level of territorial homogeneity over time until the 2006 elections – probably the point of maximum strength of the bipolar system that emerged in 1994 – when a new peak of nationalisation was reached (see [Figure 1](#)). Finally, in the 2013 elections, the rise of the highly nationalised M5S contributed to maintaining the nationalised index score at a quite high level. This last finding seems to suggest that vote de-nationalisation is not an automatic result of party-system de-institutionalisation but only one possible outcome granted by the structure of opportunity that opens up when the fluidity of the electoral market increases and new parties emerge.

### Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

### Notes

1. For a detailed and comprehensive review of the various indices and their respective shortcomings, see Caramani (2004, 61–70) and Bochsler (2010, 157).
2.  $PNS = 1 - Gini = \Sigma(1 - Gi(P))_{PN} = 1 - \Sigma(Gi(P))_{PN}$ .
3. Assuming that the heterogeneity measured at a lower territorial level, that is  $PNS(n^2)$ , corresponds to the squared heterogeneity measured at a higher level, that is  $PNS(n)$  – where  $n$  is the number of

units – we have  $PNS(n^2) = PNS(n)^2$ . After introducing the logarithmic function, the final result is the following formula:  $sPNS = (1 - G_E)^{(\log 1/\log E)} = (1 - G_E)^{(1/\log E)} = PNS_E^{(1/\log E)}$ . In the formula,  $G$  stands for Gini and  $E$  stands for the effective number of territorial units.

4. This percentage excludes the votes of Italians residing abroad. Note that the electoral breakthrough of the M5S is an unprecedented event in the history of Western Europe: it has never happened that – leaving aside founding elections – a new party, at its first national election, has been so resoundingly successful. In order to find a similar case, we have to go back to the success of Forza Italia in 1994, but then Berlusconi's party did not exceed 21% of the votes.
5. A total of 185 units of analysis (the party at a given election) fulfilled at least one criterion and have been included.
6. Note that, even if the index has a theoretical range going from 0 to 1, the great bulk of Western European elections shows values between .740 and .920 (Emanuele 2014, 67–68). Elections with a Bochsler's index lower than .700 are very uncommon, with the notable exception of the Belgian case. Indeed, as a rule of thumb, we can interpret values lower than .800 as indicators of heterogeneous territorial configurations in party support and values higher than .860 as indicators of very homogeneous territorial configurations.
7. For a detailed analysis of the conditions of party system de-structuring, see Sani (1992).
8. The conservative Alleanza Nazionale is a deviant case since, at .824, its mean sPNS is quite a bit higher than that of its forerunner, the MSI.
9. The other two dimensions are, according to Bartolini and Mair (1990, 208), social homogeneity and cultural distinctiveness.
10. Data on left-party membership have been taken from Katz and Mair (1992), Van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke (2012) and from official data. The PCI, PSI and PSDI have been taken as left parties during the period 1948 to 1987. The PDS-DS-PD, Rifondazione Comunista (PRC), the Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI) and Sinistra, Ecologia e Libertà have been included for the later period.
11. Source: Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2011). Data refer to net union membership (students, the unemployed and retired members are excluded).
12. According to Caramani (2004, 29), 'the territoriality of a political cleavage is essentially equivalent to the degree to which (linguistic, religious, economic) groups of individuals are opposed along territorial lines'.
13. For a detailed review of the existing measures, see Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2010, 33–37).
14. A different argument is advanced by Harbers (2010), who comes to conclusions similar to those of Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola (2009). According to Harbers, party aggregation across districts becomes more challenging as the number of districts increases. Given that SMD systems have a larger number of districts than PR systems, the former should decrease nationalisation.
15. Also known as the least squares index  $G = \sqrt{1/2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2$ , where  $v_i$  is the share of votes for party  $i$ ,  $s$  the share of seats for party  $i$ .
16.  $ENEP = 1/\sum p_i^2$  where  $p$  is the party's national share of votes.
17. According to Sikk (2005, 399), 'genuinely new parties' are 'parties that are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members'.
18.  $TV = \sum P_i V/2$  where  $P_i V$  represents the absolute change in the aggregate vote for party  $i$  between two consecutive elections.
19. On the opposite strategies of concentration and diffusion, see Caramani (1994, 278–279).

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